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ABSTRACT 
Legionnaires’ disease (LD) is the second most common type of bacterial pneumonia in the 
United States.  It disproportionately affects elderly and immunocompromised individuals and can 
lead to disability and death.  LD is caused by the waterborne bacterium Legionella which is 
found in many aqueous environments and amplified in man-made structures such as cooling 
towers and building water systems.  LD transmission occurs through inhalation or aspiration of 
Legionella contaminated water.  The majority of LD cases in the US and worldwide are 
community-acquired with no known association with other cases, which are referred to as 
sporadic cases.  The environmental source is often unknown, thus hindering targeted control 
measures.  The overall objective of this dissertation is to better define the epidemiology of 
sporadic, community-acquired LD in order to inform targeted public health interventions.  This 
objective was addressed through three studies. The first was a literature review of environmental 
sources of sporadic, community-acquired LD.  We found that residential potable water, large 
building water systems and car travel contribute to a substantial proportion of sporadic LD.  
Cooling towers may also be a significant source, but definitive linkage to sporadic cases is 
difficult.  The second study assessed the prevalence of Legionella pneumophila bacteria in 
Allegheny County cooling towers.  We found L. pneumophila in almost half of cooling towers 
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tested; however, the concentration level was relatively low.  Facilities were encouraged to 
develop a water management plan and conduct annual basin water emptying, quarterly cleaning, 
quarterly Legionella testing and diligent inspection of older towers.  The third study is a 
prospective simulation of community-acquired LD spatiotemporal cluster detection is presented 
in chapter four to demonstrate the utility and performance of this method in Allegheny County.  
Larger, cooling tower-associated simulated outbreaks were detected.  Health departments should 
consider adopting this method for improved LD outbreak detection, faster investigation initiation 
and potential disease prevention.  Overall, the findings of these three complementary studies are 
of public health relevance given they inform locally-focused intervention strategies for LD 
prevention.  LD is a costly disease and interventions should be efficiently tailored for local 
response.  Health departments should allocate resources for locally-focused interventions to 
reduce LD incidence. 
 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 LEGIONELLOSIS .............................................................................................. 1 
1.1.1 Legionella ....................................................................................................... 2 
1.1.2 Legionnaires’ Disease Incidence .................................................................. 4 
1.2 SPORADIC LEGIONNAIRES’ DISEASE ....................................................... 5 
1.2.1 Cooling Towers and Legionnaires’ Disease ................................................ 6 
1.2.2 Spatiotemporal Legionnaires’ Disease Cluster Detection ......................... 8 
1.2.3 Allegheny County, PA LD Incidence ........................................................ 10 
2.0 ENVIRONMENTAL SOURCES OF SPORADIC COMMUNITY-ACQUIRED 
LEGIONNAIRES’ DISEASE: A REVIEW ............................................................................. 11 
2.1 ABSTRACT........................................................................................................ 12 
2.2 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 13 
2.3 METHODS ......................................................................................................... 14 
2.4 RESULTS ........................................................................................................... 16 
2.5 DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................... 17 
2.6 TABLES AND FIGURES ................................................................................. 24 
3.0 COOLING TOWER MAINTENANCE PRACTICES AND LEGIONELLA 
PREVALENCE, ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA, 2016 ............................................................ 37 
vii 
3.1 ABSTRACT........................................................................................................ 39 
3.2 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 40 
3.3 METHODS ......................................................................................................... 41 
3.4 RESULTS ........................................................................................................... 45 
3.5 DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................... 48 
3.6 TABLES AND FIGURES ................................................................................. 54 
4.0 SIMULATION OF LEGIONNAIRES’ DISEASE SPATIOTEMPORAL 
CLUSTER DETECTION, ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA ..................................................... 63 
4.1 ABSTRACT........................................................................................................ 64 
4.2 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 65 
4.3 METHODS ......................................................................................................... 67 
4.4 RESULTS ........................................................................................................... 71 
4.5 DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................... 72 
4.6 TABLES AND FIGURES ................................................................................. 77 
5.0 DISSERTATION DISCUSSION .............................................................................. 84 
5.1 MAJOR FINDINGS .......................................................................................... 84 
5.2 PUBLIC HEALTH SIGNIFICANCE.............................................................. 85 
5.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS................................................................................... 87 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 90 
 viii 
 LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1. Studies supporting definite rank of environmental sources. ........................................ 24 
Table 2.2. Studies supporting probable rank of environmental sources. ...................................... 26 
Table 2.3. Studies supporting possible rank of environmental sources. ....................................... 28 
Table 2.4: Studies supporting suspect rank of environmental sources. ........................................ 30 
Table 3.1. Survey and sampling response rate by building type (n = 412), Allegheny County, PA, 
summer 2016. ................................................................................................................................ 54 
Table 3.2. Legionella pneumophila concentration levels by building type (n = 42), Allegheny 
County, PA, 2016. ......................................................................................................................... 55 
Table 3.3. Unadjusted associations between continuous Legionella pneumophila level and 
dichotomous factors(n = 42), ........................................................................................................ 56 
Table 3.4. Unadjusted associations between continuous Legionella pneumophila level and 
continuous factors (n=42), Allegheny County, PA, 2016. ............................................................ 58 
Table 3.5. Significant unadjusted associations with Legionella pneumophila level stratified by 
hospital status. ............................................................................................................................... 59 
Table 3.6. Multivariable linear regression model of independent factors and log-transformed 
Legionella pneumophila continuous outcome. ............................................................................. 59 
Table 3.7. Pairwise SNP differences among 13 serogroup 1 L. pneumophila isolates using 
LEG551 as reference genome. ...................................................................................................... 60 
 ix 
Table 3.8. Pairwise SNP differences among 4 ST2329 isolates using LEG443 as reference 
genome. ......................................................................................................................................... 61 
Table 4.1. Legionnaires’ disease simulated outbreak characteristics based on published outbreak 
investigations. ............................................................................................................................... 77 
Table 4.2. Days from third outbreak-associated case report to outbreak detection for three 
simulated Legionnaires’ disease outbreaks, Allegheny County, 2016. ........................................ 78 
Table 4.3. Simulated outbreak 1 daily analyses validity statistics (n = 105 days). ...................... 78 
Table 4.4. Simulated outbreak 2 daily analyses validity statistics (n = 125 days). ...................... 79 
Table 4.5. Simulated outbreak 3 daily analyses validity statistics (n = 94 days). ........................ 80 
 
 x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1 Literature search strategy for sporadic Legionnaires' disease sources. ....................... 36 
Figure 3.1. Phylogeny of 13 serogroup 1 L. pneumophila genomes based on aligned SNPs to 
reference assembly, LEG551. ....................................................................................................... 62 
Figure 4.1. Confirmed legionellosis cases and age-adjusted legionellosis incidence rates, 
Allegheny County, PA, 2006-2016. .............................................................................................. 81 
Figure 4.2. Observed baseline and simulated outbreak-associated legionellosis cases, Allegheny 
County, PA, 2016. ......................................................................................................................... 82 
Figure 4.3. Simulated outbreak- associated Legionnaires’ disease cases and simulated outbreak 
buffers, Allegheny County, PA. .................................................................................................... 83 
 
 
1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation topic stemmed from observations made in Allegheny County, PA, with regard 
to Legionnaires’ disease (LD) epidemiologic trends.  These trends are also observed nationally 
and globally.  Most LD is community-acquired with no known association with other cases and 
the environmental source is unknown.  Each chapter of this dissertation contributes to an 
improved understanding of the epidemiology of sporadic, community-acquired LD in general 
and more specifically in Allegheny County.  The following introductory sections provide 
necessary context for each dissertation chapter.  First, general information about the disease, the 
bacterial cause, and incidence is presented.  Second, sporadic, community-acquired LD is 
defined in more detail and the importance of cooling towers as an environmental source of 
sporadic and outbreak-related LD is discussed.  Finally, the burden of LD in Allegheny County 
is presented to rationalize the necessity and advantage of studying LD in this part of the US.   
1.1 LEGIONELLOSIS 
Legionellosis is an infectious respiratory condition which encompasses both LD and Pontiac 
Fever.  Both conditions are caused by the Gram-negative bacteria, Legionella.  LD is the second 
most common form of bacterial pneumonia in the US [1].  Pontiac fever is a less common, 
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milder febrile illness that is usually self-limiting.  Henceforth, LD will be the focus of this 
dissertation.   
LD occurs when patients inhale or less commonly aspirate water contaminated with 
Legionella bacteria [2].  The incubation period can range from 2 to 14 days but is most 
commonly 2 to 10 days.  Elderly individuals are susceptible to LD as well as people who are 
immunocompromised, smokers, or have underlying conditions such as chronic respiratory 
diseases [2].    Symptoms include high fever, cough, chills, shortness of breath and sometimes 
headache.  About half of LD patients exhibit a productive cough.  Neurological and/or 
gastrointestinal symptoms can also accompany pneumonia in LD patients [2].  LD also causes 
neurological and/or neuromuscular symptoms and some patients experience post-traumatic stress 
disorder.  Generally, mortality rates in the US range from 5 – 10% for community-acquired cases 
and about 20% for nosocomial cases, but patients who are immunocompromised experience 
higher mortality rates.  About 12% of community-acquired cases in Europe are fatal [3]. 
1.1.1 Legionella 
To date, 58 species of Legionella have been discovered [2].  Legionella pneumophila accounts 
for an estimated 90% of Legionella infections in the US [4]  L. pneumophila is also the most 
virulent [2].  Legionella are found naturally in soil and water; however, Legionella are amplified 
under certain conditions in man-made structures which can lead to disease outbreaks [2].  These 
include warm temperature, stagnant conditions, increased sediment and biofilm.  Optimal growth 
of Legionella occurs between 77-107.6 ̊F [3, 5].  Deactivation was previously thought to start at 
about 122 ̊F; however, more recent research indicates 123.8 ̊F could provide a unique growth 
environment given deactivation of other inhibitory microbes [6].  Legionella thrive as 
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intracellular parasites of organisms such as amoebae, ciliated protozoa and slime molds.  
Legionella multiply in biofilm when amoebae are present but only subsist in the absence of 
amoebae [4].   
The following are confirmed sources of LD outbreaks and single cases where the 
Legionella strain that caused patient disease was indistinguishable from the Legionella strain 
found in an environmental source: building water systems potable water, residential potable 
water, evaporative cooling towers, whirlpool spas, potting soil and compost (L. longbeachae), 
bath water, indoor and outdoor decorative fountains, wastewater treatment plants, room 
humidifiers, ice and ice machines, mist machines, air conditioning systems, cooling liquid for 
machinery, and natural sources like soil and springs [7].  Unconfirmed, but possible sources of 
LD include water added as windshield wiper fluid in motor vehicles, medical respiratory 
equipment, water used for cleaning, dental exposures, roof harvested rainfall, construction and 
excavation, ground and surface water, and rainwater from puddles [7]. 
Prevention measures for reduced Legionella growth have been shown to be effective for 
various man-made environments (i.e. building water systems, cooling towers) where Legionella 
tend to proliferate; however, eliminating the bacteria from water sources is difficult given the 
non-sterile state of naturally occurring water sources [4].  In 2016, the US Environmental 
Protection Agency published ‘Technologies for Legionella control’ which summarized 
disinfection methods for building water systems such as hotels, hospitals and large apartment 
buildings [8].  The summarized technologies include chlorine, monochloramine, chlorine 
dioxide, copper-silver ionization, ultra violet light, and ozone.  The methodology as well as 
advantages and disadvantages were presented for each technology.  This document also 
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summarized the utility of point-of-use filters as well as emergency remediation techniques such 
as superheat-and-flush [8]. 
1.1.2 Legionnaires’ Disease Incidence 
A reported increase in LD incidence has been observed in multiple developed countries around 
the globe [9-11].  In the US, reported LD incidence has more than doubled, from 0.78 cases per 
100,000 population in 2003 to 1.58 in 2013 [12].  This change in reported incidence differs by 
US geographic region, with the Mid-Atlantic region experiencing both the highest incidence rate 
and largest increase in incidence [9]. 
Many reasons for this increase have been offered including changes in LD diagnostic 
testing and increased awareness of the need for LD diagnostic testing among healthcare 
providers.  In clinical practice, urinary antigen detection is the most commonly used diagnostic 
test for LD; however, it only detects L. pneumophila serogroup 1, which is also the serogroup 
and serogroup that most frequently causes LD.  The urinary antigen test is also used most 
frequently because it is a quick diagnostic tool, urine is a readily-available specimen, and 
Legionella are particularly difficult to culture [2].  A major limitation of the urinary antigen test 
is that it is culture-independent and therefore provides no bacterial isolate for molecular 
epidemiologic studies of transmission. Urinary antigen usage for LD diagnostics has increased 
since the mid-1990s; however, researchers do not believe that this change in diagnostic practice 
is entirely responsible for the significant increase in LD seen worldwide [13].   
Quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) has also become more widely 
used in recent years because it produces results quickly and can detect more serogroups and 
species of Legionella than the urinary antigen test.  Similar to the urinary antigen test, qPCR also 
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does not produce an isolate for the studies of transmission.  Culture is the gold-standard 
diagnostic test for LD.  However, specimens for culture can be difficult to obtain because LD 
patients often do not produce sputum.  Without culture, patients infected with L. pneumophila 
serogroups 2 – 14 and other Legionella species cannot be diagnosed.  Also, clinical cultures are 
required in the event of an outbreak to determine Legionella strain relatedness among cases and 
between case isolates and environmental isolates.   
Other postulates for the increase in LD incidence include changes in Legionella favorable 
weather conditions, more frequent installation of building cooling towers to increase energy 
efficiency, and changes in residential water sources from ground to surface water [11, 13-15].  It 
is likely that a combination of these factors and others led to increased LD incidence given the 
plethora of LD waterborne sources.   
1.2 SPORADIC LEGIONNAIRES’ DISEASE 
LD cases can be classified into two categories: outbreak and non-outbreak cases.  Furthermore, 
outbreak and non-outbreak cases can be classified as healthcare-acquired or community-
acquired.  This dissertation will generally focus on non-outbreak, community-acquired LD.  A 
non-outbreak case is defined as a case not attributed to an outbreak investigation and thus has no 
known association with other cases.  An LD outbreak is defined as two or more cases sharing a 
common exposure during each case’s incubation period such as a hotel stay or exposure to a 
specific water source [9].  The term ‘sporadic case’ is used in the literature to describe non-
outbreak cases [2, 16, 17].  Nevertheless, public health resources, specifically in the US, 
sometimes prevent investigation of sporadic cases that could uncover common exposures 
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between cases and thus outbreaks.  Spatial-temporal cluster detection is discussed in the fourth 
chapter of this dissertation.  This method has the potential to uncover outbreaks among 
seemingly sporadic cases; however, false alarm signals are also generated using this method. 
The majority of cases reported in the US and worldwide are classified as sporadic with no 
confirmed source of infection [4, 18].  A review article published in 1995 by Bhopal summarized 
known sources of sporadic disease including home water sources and cooling towers; however, 
the author emphasized that more large-scale research needed to be conducted before drawing 
conclusions about the major sources of sporadic LD [16].  Sources of sporadic LD will be 
reviewed in the second chapter of this dissertation. 
1.2.1 Cooling Towers and Legionnaires’ Disease 
Evaporative cooling towers have been associated with both sporadic and outbreak-related LD 
[14, 19].  Evaporative cooling is a technique used to cool large air conditioning systems, 
refrigeration systems and industrial processing systems [20], with the goal of increasing energy 
efficiency.  Cooling towers and evaporative condensers utilize evaporative cooling technology 
and produce aerosolized water as a byproduct.  Cooling towers are classified as open-circuit or 
closed-circuit.  Open-circuit cooling towers are the most common type of evaporative cooling 
system [20].  Warm water produced by an air conditioning system, for example, is sprayed into 
the tower and cooled over a large surface area which includes a type of media called fill.  A fan 
also cools the fill area.  The cooled water then travels out of the tower and back to the system 
from which it originated.   
Closed-circuit cooling towers and evaporative condensers are structured similarly [20].  
They include a heat exchange coil that allows a system coolant to cool over an enclosed pipe 
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surface.  Closed-circuit systems cool a water coolant, while evaporative condensers usually cool 
a refrigerant gas [20].  The material enclosed in the heat exchange coil is cooled using the same 
mechanism as an open-circuit system.  Both fans and a large surface area are used for cooling. 
Open-circuit and closed-circuit cooling towers as well as evaporative condensers can 
provide an environment for Legionella growth if water temperatures are warm (68 – 113 ̊ F) and 
biofilm, rust and/or scale are present [20].  In some systems, water can be stored and 
recirculated.  If not maintained, storage and recirculation of cooling tower or evaporative 
condenser water can contribute to Legionella proliferation [5, 20, 21].  If Legionella grows in the 
system, contaminated water is aerosolized and people can be exposed to the bacterium.  In 
addition to outbreaks, cooling towers have also been linked to sporadic LD [22].  Cooling tower 
outbreaks may also be difficult to detect because cases are often unaware of cooling tower 
exposure. 
Maintenance strategies are challenging to generalize given the variability in individual 
cooling systems.  The American Society for Heating and Air-Conditioning Engineers 
(ASHRAE) published Guideline 12-2000, which describes strategies for evaporative cooling 
system cleaning, disinfection, scale and corrosion control, and appropriate start up and shut down 
of the system [5].  This document describes various biocide options such as oxidizing and/or 
non-oxidizing biocides and ultimately concludes that biocide choice should be made by someone 
with an understanding of water chemistry and microbiology as well as a thorough understanding 
of the specific system.   
In 2015, ASHRAE published 88-2015 which describes risk minimization through 
development of a building water system water safety plan [21].  If a building water system 
includes an evaporative cooling system, the cooling system must be addressed in the water safety 
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plan.  Other guidelines have been published, but no prescriptive guideline for evaporative 
cooling system maintenance exists.  A study published by Rangel et al. reviewed available 
guidelines as well as cooling tower-related outbreaks [23].  They suggest that vague guidelines 
could be contributing to inadequately-maintained cooling towers and thus transmission of 
Legionella.  From this point forward, the dissertation will discuss cooling towers rather than the 
more general category of evaporative cooling systems given that cooling towers are the most 
common of these systems. 
During the summer of 2015, the New York City Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene (DOHMH) investigated an LD outbreak caused by a hotel cooling tower that sickened 
138 people [19].  As a result of this outbreak, all cooling towers are now regulated in the city and 
state of New York [24].  These regulations require registration, quarterly certified inspection, 
annual certified cleaning, quarterly Legionella testing and development of an ASHRAE 188-
2015 compliant water safety plan.   The relationship between LD incidence and cooling tower 
regulation is unclear [23].  An evaluation of the impact of the DOHMH regulation is currently in 
progress [19].  These regulations were the first of their kind in the US. Cooling tower registration 
alone could aide in outbreak investigations and spatiotemporal cluster detection. 
1.2.2 Spatiotemporal Legionnaires’ Disease Cluster Detection 
The 2015 New York City cooling tower-associated outbreak was initially detected using a 
spatiotemporal cluster detection program [25].  This specific program utilizes a space-time 
permutation scan statistic which is available in SaTScanTM, a free software program [26, 27].  
The space-time permutation scan statistic is appropriate for retrospective and prospective cluster 
detection and does not require an estimation of underlying population-at-risk.   
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The space-time permutation scan statistic identifies clusters by cylindrically analyzing a 
spatial area using thousands or millions of scanning windows or cylinders of various heights and 
widths.  Each scanning window is centered on a census tract centroid.  The scanning window 
height is time and width is spatial area.  Numerous scanning windows are created using 
predetermined parameters.  For LD cluster detection, the maximum scanning window height or 
temporal window is either 30 days or 180 days; the maximum scanning window width or spatial 
area is the area of 50% of the cases reported in the study period [28].  The study period is one 
year when using a maximum temporal window of 30 days and two years when using a maximum 
temporal window of 180 days. 
 The significance of an LD case cluster occurring in each scanning window is determined 
by comparing the likelihood ratio test using actual LD case data and the likelihood ratio test 
results using 999 Monte Carlo simulated datasets.  The p-value of the test statistic is calculated 
by dividing the rank of the likelihood ratio test using the real LD case data by the number of 
simulations plus one.  The reciprocal of the p-value, the recurrence interval (RI), determines 
significance.  The RI is defined as the number of days of analyses required in order to expect the 
number of clusters at least as unlikely as the observed cluster to be equal to 1 by chance alone 
[26].  
 Several New York City LD clusters have been successfully detected by this cluster 
detection program performed daily by DOHMH [28].  This detection program has the potential 
to improve surveillance efficiency and relate seemingly sporadic cases.  Relating sporadic cases 
in space and time could help pinpoint a harmful environmental source and lead to remediation 
efforts and potentially disease prevention. 
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1.2.3 Allegheny County, PA LD Incidence 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, located in the Mid-Atlantic region of the US, experiences high 
rates of LD [29, 30].  Allegheny County encompasses the city of Pittsburgh and the surrounding 
suburbs.  The proportion of Allegheny County residents 65 years and older is larger than the 
proportion in the US  as a whole, and elderly individuals are at higher risk of LD; however, over 
the last decade, Allegheny County’s average LD rate has remained above 4 per 100,000 after 
age-adjustment.  Between 2006 and 2016, the age-adjusted LD rate in Allegheny County ranged 
from 3.3 to 7.2 per 100,000 [29, 30].  In contrast, the age-adjusted LD rate for the US in 2009 
was 1.15 per 100,000 [9]. 
Over 80% of LD cases reported every year in Allegheny County are not known to be 
related to outbreaks or healthcare facilities [29, 30].  These community-acquired cases are 
sporadic and the source of infection is unknown.  Although travel has also been identified as a 
risk factor for sporadic LD [31], fewer than 5% of sporadic Allegheny County cases report 
traveling during their incubation period.  Travel-associated cases are more prevalent in other 
parts of the US and Europe [29, 32].  Most Allegheny County sporadic case-patients are likely to 
have acquired the infection in the County.  Thus, Allegheny County is an important place to 
study community-acquired sporadic LD given the necessity to better understand the origins of 
this disease in this part of the country.  The second and third chapters of this dissertation describe 
community-acquired LD studies specifically designed for Allegheny County.  Improving our 
understanding of the sources of community-acquired LD, especially in Allegheny County, will 
inform future targeted interventions for disease burden reduction. 
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2.1 ABSTRACT 
BACKGROUND:  Most Legionnaires’ disease (LD) in the US and abroad is community-
acquired and believed to be sporadic, or non-outbreak associated.  Most patients are exposed to 
numerous water sources, thus making investigations difficult.  Identifying known sources of 
sporadic community-acquired LD will inform sporadic LD investigations as well as highlight 
directions for research.  The objective is to summarize and rank sporadic LD sources based on 
the level of linkage between the environmental source and cases. 
METHODS:  A PubMed search was conducted using the search terms legion* and (origins or 
source or transmission) and (sporadic or community-acquired).  Studies of nosocomial and/or 
outbreak-associated disease were excluded from this review.  Definite, probable, possible and 
suspect ranks were assigned to sources based on evidence of linkage to sporadic LD.    
RESULTS: The search yielded 196 articles and 43 articles were included in the final review 
after application of exclusion criteria.  A total of 28 sources were identified.  Of these, eight were 
assigned definite rank including residential potable water and car air-conditioner water leakage.  
Probable rank was assigned to five sources including solar-heated potable water and soil.  
Possible rank was assigned to nine sources including residential potable water and cooling 
towers.  Suspect rank was assigned to 20 sources including large building water systems and 
cooling towers. 
CONCLUSION:  Residential potable water, large building water systems and car travel appear 
to contribute to a substantial proportion of sporadic LD.  Cooling towers are also a potentially 
significant source; however, definitive linkage to sporadic cases proves difficult.  The sources of 
sporadic LD cannot be definitively identified for most cases. 
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2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Legionnaires’ disease (LD) is a common form of community-acquired bacterial pneumonia [2].  
This waterborne disease is caused by the bacteria Legionella, which naturally exist in lakes and 
rivers and amplifies in building water systems and other man-made structures.  Persons develop 
LD by inhaling aerosolized Legionella contaminated water or aspirating potable contaminated 
water.  LD disproportionately affects elderly and immunocompromised individuals.  Chronic 
medical conditions such as diabetes mellitus and COPD are also associated with increased risk, 
as is current and former smoking [2].  Almost all LD patients require hospitalization and average 
mortality rates range from 15 to 20% [3]. 
From 2000 to 2014, the reported annual rate of legionellosis in the US, which includes 
both LD and the milder Pontiac Fever, increased almost 300% from 0.42 to 1.62 per 100,000 
[33].  US surveillance from 2005 to 2009 revealed that only 4% of cases during that time period 
were associated with known outbreaks.  The same trend was observed in other parts of the world 
[18].   
The source of LD outbreaks is commonly pursued in order to stop the outbreak; however, 
the source of sporadic or isolated cases is rarely pursued [33].  Sporadic LD is defined as an 
isolated, single case with no known associations with other cases and thus no known associations 
with outbreaks. The source of LD, as a waterborne disease, can be very difficult to determine 
given the plethora of water sources to which a person may be exposed during the 10-day 
incubation period. 
LD is a reportable condition in the US that healthcare organizations and providers are 
required to report to health departments.  The intensity of sporadic LD investigations varies by 
jurisdiction.  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends investigation 
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of sporadic community-acquired LD if two or more cases share a common exposure [12].  
Jurisdictions can elect to investigate sporadic community-acquired cases; however, limited 
public health resources often restrict these investigations.  CDC also requests that all state and 
local health departments complete a case report form which includes information on outcome, 
occupation, travel, healthcare, whirlpool spa exposures and use of respiratory equipment [33].  
Through this form, the CDC determines travel, occupational and healthcare-associated risk.  In-
depth investigation and analysis of sporadic case relatedness is left to state and local health 
departments.   
Knowledge about the sources of sporadic LD assists public health practitioners to 
efficiently conduct Legionella source investigations. The most recent review of sporadic LD 
sources was published in 1995 [16].  This review summarized known sources of sporadic disease 
including residential potable water sources and cooling towers; however, the author emphasized 
that additional large-scale research needed to be conducted before drawing conclusions about the 
major sources of sporadic LD [16].   The purpose of the current review is to update current 
knowledge about known sources of sporadic LD. 
2.3 METHODS 
This narrative review was initiated through a literature search of MEDLINE conducted on 
August 9, 2017.  PubMed was used to identify potential articles for inclusion using the following 
search criteria: 
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(legion*[All Fields] AND (“origin”[All Fields] OR ("source"[All Fields]) OR
 ("transmission"[Subheading] OR "transmission"[All Fields])) AND (“sporadic”[All
 Fields] OR ("community"[All Fields]) AND “acquired”[All Fields])) 
All 196 articles generated through this search were considered for inclusion through title and 
abstract review (Figure 2.1).  Exclusion criteria in the final review included description of 
sources of waterborne pathogens without specifically discussing Legionella, focus only on 
clinical or laboratory aspects, inclusion of only nosocomial infections, and studies of outbreak 
cases.  Review articles were also excluded.  Full text articles were obtained if the article 
appeared to meet inclusion criteria (Figure 2.1). 
 A sporadic LD case was defined as a patient meeting a LD case definition without 
exposure to a healthcare facility and no known association with an outbreak.  A healthcare 
facility was defined as an acute care hospital, long-term acute care hospital, or long-term care 
facility, such as skilled nursing, rehabilitation, or assisted living facility. 
Through review of full text articles’ citations, other articles not identified through the 
PubMed search were considered for final selection.  Articles included in the final selection were 
studies that investigated origins or sources of sporadic cases either through full epidemiologic 
and/or environmental investigations, sometimes including molecular linkage of Legionella 
isolates, spatial analysis of sporadic cases, or environmental testing alone.  Articles that solely 
described environmental testing were only included if the authors suggested linkage between the 
source and sporadic disease (Figure 2.1).   
Ranking was assigned to a source based on evidence from a single study.  A source may 
be categorized into multiple ranks based on evidence from multiple studies.  Definitive rank was 
assigned when the environmental source was molecularly linked to sporadic LD cases.  Probable 
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rank was assigned to a source when human and environmental isolates shared a common 
Legionella species, but no molecular testing was performed.  The types of studies included in the 
definitive and probable ranks included single case reports and larger investigative studies where 
intensive environmental sampling was completed.  Possible rank was assigned to a source when 
either epidemiologic or spatial analyses linked sporadic cases to a potential source.  The types of 
studies included in this rank were descriptive case studies, case-control studies, cross-sectional 
environmental studies, and epidemiologic spatial analyses.  Statistical methods included basic 
descriptive proportions and relative risks as well as ecologic spatial analyses and complex cluster 
detection methods.  Finally, suspect rank was assigned to a source when environmental sampling 
was conducted and linkage to sporadic cases was only suggested theoretically.  Suspect rank was 
also assigned to a source when linkage between cases and an environmental source was 
suggested through descriptive case series. 
2.4 RESULTS 
Of the 196 articles identified, 138 were excluded based on title and abstract screening (Figure 
2.1).  The full text of 58 articles was reviewed.  Through this final review of full text, 12 
additional articles were identified through reference review.  Of 70 identified total articles, 27 
were excluded because confirmed or probable linkage between the source and sporadic disease 
was not specifically studied and/or the source of disease was not explicitly discussed. We 
included 43 articles in this sporadic disease source review (Figure 2.1).   
A total of 28 environmental sources of sporadic LD of various likelihoods were 
identified.  Studies of eight sources of definite rank demonstrated molecular linkage to sporadic 
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disease cases. These sources included potable water from single family homes and apartment 
buildings, leaking water from car air conditioning systems, potable water from a construction 
site, potable water from a dental office as well as the dental unit waterline, hot springs and 
potable water used in a humidifier (Table 1).  Studies of five sources of probable rank described 
linkage without molecular confirmation between a source and a case.  These sources included 
water from car air conditioning systems, home spas, natural soil, potting soil and water from a 
home solar-heated hot water tank (Table 2).  Of those studies that described a definite rank or 
probable rank source, only four studied more than one case [34-37].   
Studies of nine sources of possible rank described statistical significance between a 
source and sporadic cases.  These sources included water from construction sites, cooling towers, 
residential potable water, driving, general travel and weather patterns (Table 3).  Suspect rank 
was assigned to 20 studies of sources including construction sites, travel, home potable water, 
dental office potable water, hot springs, driving and car air-conditioning, rainwater on roads, 
large building water systems, cooling towers, composting facilities and soil (Table 4). 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
The source of most sporadic LD cases is difficult to confirm.  Nevertheless, as evidenced by this 
review, many potential sources have been linked to cases.  The studies of possible and suspect 
rank included many more cases, but the types of analyses are less resource intensive compared to 
the methods required to molecularly confirm sources.  Some reasons why it has proven difficult 
to confirm sources of sporadic disease include limited public health resources to conduct 
environmental investigations for single sporadic cases, limited availability of clinical isolates, 
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and the common lag in time between when a case is reported to public health, interviewed and 
when public health conducts an environmental investigation.  The original source of exposure 
may be difficult to pinpoint through sampling if a great length of time has passed since the 
original exposure.   
It vital not only to identify the sources of sporadic LD but also to identify the sources that 
pose the greatest risk in terms of the number of potential cases.  Understanding this aspect of 
sporadic LD sources ultimately helps public health professionals conduct more efficient 
environmental investigations and prevent future disease.  Published case reports do not answer 
the question of risk magnitude regarding the source despite the definitive link between a source 
and single or multiple cases.  This is the benefit of some of the less definitive type studies 
included in this review.  For example, Miyamoto et al. reported a definitive molecular link 
between a sporadic case and a Japanese hot spring [38].  Lin et al. conducted an environmental 
study of Taiwanese hot springs to determine the prevalence of L. pneumophila [39].  Though not 
conducted in the same country, these studies complement each other by providing a better 
understanding of the risk of sporadic disease associated with hot springs.  Hot springs most likely 
are not a major source given low environmental prevalence and limited human exposure [39].   
The same type of complementary study was conducted in apartment buildings water 
systems, large building water systems, and construction areas (Table 1).  Nevertheless, the link 
between sporadic cases and construction occupation has been questioned given the older case-
control and case series studies that over-sampled construction workers [7].  Apartment buildings 
and large building water systems likely pose a significant risk especially if patients are 
immunocompromised.  Legionella prevalence found in these types of buildings ranged from 12 
to 33% [36, 40, 41]. 
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Several large scale case-control studies and spatial epidemiologic studies included in this 
review shed light on risk magnitude of several sources such as travel, occupation, cooling 
towers, and potable water.  Travel is commonly reported amongst sporadic LD cases as 
demonstrated by several large case-controls studies, conducted in the US, Netherlands and 
France [18, 31].  These studies showed elevated relative risks associated with overnight travel.  
The Netherlands study demonstrated an elevated relative risk of 33 (95% CI 14 – 78) associated 
with travel abroad [31].  Almost 25% of US LD is travel-associated, the majority being domestic 
travel [9].  Potential sources of sporadic travel-associated LD include hotel and other large 
building water systems as well as cooling towers. 
Early studies of sporadic cases found that occupation may pose a risk [42-44].  
Professional driving was suggested as a sporadic disease risk by a Netherlands case-control study 
and a Turkish study of professional drivers which found elevated L. pneumophila antibodies [31, 
45].  Car air conditioning has been suggested as a source given the results of a larger 
environmental study in Japan and a definitive link between a case and environmental sampling of 
car air conditioning [37, 46].  A British case-control study found 7-times elevated risk associated 
with driving through an industrial area and almost 50-times elevated risk associated with using 
water for windshield wiper fluid rather than commercial wiper fluid [47].  A small sample of cars 
using water as wiper fluid tested positive for L. pneumophila.  The authors estimated that 20% of 
sporadic disease in England and Wales is caused by driving while using water used as wiper 
fluid [48].   
Cooling towers are known sources of outbreaks, but are difficult to pinpoint as sources of 
sporadic disease.  Several retrospective UK spatial analyses identified cooling towers as a 
probable source of sporadic LD [22, 49, 50].  The distribution of sporadic cases arguably did not 
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appear to be associated with potable water systems, but rather with the dispersion of cooling 
tower mist.  Two studies showed that the risk of sporadic disease increased as a person lived 
closer to a cooling tower, especially within 3 km [22, 49].  Ricketts et al. suggests that 20% of 
sporadic disease in England and Wales is due to cooling towers even after adjusting for 
socioeconomic status.  Nevertheless, an earlier spatial study in Nottingham, England did not find 
a spatial association between cases and cooling towers [51].  This discrepancy may be due in part 
to differences in Nottingham case characteristics given Nottingham has an unusually high 
incidence.  A significant spatial association between industrial cooling towers and sporadic cases 
was observed in France which aligned well with the results from the broader UK spatial analyses 
[17]. 
The Nottingham spatial analysis suggested that potable water may be associated with 
sporadic disease.  Potable water in single family homes, high rise apartment buildings and other 
large buildings were also molecularly confirmed as the source of several sporadic cases through 
studies conducted in the US and the Netherlands.  A 1992 Pittsburgh, PA environmental 
prevalence study found that an average of 6% of homes from six different areas (range 0 to 22%) 
were positive for Legionella [52].  A case-control study conducted in the US found increased risk 
associated with home plumbing repairs and electric versus gas home hot water tanks [53].  An 
environmental prevalence study in Germany found that 12% of homes with hot water storage 
tanks were positive for L. pneumophila compared to zero homes with instantaneous water heaters 
[54].  A similar finding was reported after a Singapore environmental prevalence study of home 
potable water [55].  Filters for home potable water, especially those with storage tanks, may be 
appropriate for immunocompromised individuals. 
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Finally, several natural sources of increased sporadic disease should be considered 
including soil and rain water.  Several Legionella species, including L. longbeachae and L. 
pneumophila, have been identified in soil in Australia, the Netherlands and the US and poses a 
risk to those handling soil [7, 56, 57].  The transmission mechanism is not completely clear; 
however, given the prevalence in soil, it is unlikely that soil significantly contributes to the 
burden of sporadic LD.  Legionella was found in only 4% of rainwater water samples tested in 
the Netherlands [58].  Nevertheless, 36% of rainwater samples from roads in Tokyo were 
positive for Legionella suggesting a risk of LD when driving and inhaling aerosolized road 
rainwater [59].  Rainfall and humidity were associated with increased sporadic LD in New Jersey 
[48].  Changes in weather could create more favorable Legionella growth conditions in sources 
such as cooling towers and potable water. 
Despite the source research reviewed, sources remain unidentified for most cases.  This 
shortcoming is emphasized by the results of enhanced surveillance conducted in the Netherlands 
where sources were only identified in 3% of more than 1400 intensive case investigations 
conducted over a decade [34].  Stout et al. confirmed the source of 8 (40%) of 20 sporadic cases 
[35].   
This literature review includes several limitations.  First, publication bias is likely given 
that that the results of many public health investigations, particularly those that do not identify 
the source, are not published. As a result, both confirmed sources and investigations that fail to 
identify the source are underreported in the literature.  Second is the lack of depth of studies 
supporting definite and probable ranked sources.  As was mentioned, it is resource intensive to 
confirm the source of sporadic LD.  Most definite and probable ranked sources were confirmed 
by single case studies.  Relative importance is difficult to glean from case studies and thus 
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requires additional, complementary research.  Future large scale studies are needed to discover 
and further explore significant sources of sporadic disease.  For example, the findings of studies 
support lower rank sources, such as cooling towers, should be further explored by larger scale, 
resource intensive research to more definitively confirm sources which may emphasize the need 
for enhanced control and prevention of Legionella contamination in cooling towers.  Also, 
definite and probable ranked sources supported by smaller studies should be investigated on a 
larger scale through epidemiologic studies and/or spatial analyses to explore risk magnitude.  
Spatial analyses of sporadic cases could also relate these seemingly isolated cases and perhaps 
uncover new environmental sources. 
LD is a costly illness both in terms of mortality, healthcare expenses and resources for 
prevention and control measures.  A UK study estimated the cost of a LD outbreak at over 
£455,000 (~ $588,000); only 14% was spent on the investigation and control measures [60].  The 
remainder was spent on case-patient healthcare.  The benefit of prevention measures far 
outweighs the monetary costs and general psychological impact of sporadic and outbreak-
associated LD.  Additional research regarding sources of sporadic disease is critical for sporadic 
LD prevention.  A greater understanding of the risk magnitude associated with sources will 
improve targeted prevention efforts.  
Conclusion 
A variety of sporadic LD sources have been identified that have the potential to cause 
isolated incidents and more wide spread clusters.  From the literature reviewed, significant 
sources of sporadic LD are residential potable water, large building water systems, car travel, 
and cooling towers.  Nevertheless, sporadic LD sources remain to be identified as even intense 
environmental investigations sometimes still do not identify a source.  Additional research is 
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required to further understand sporadic disease risk associated with known sources and uncover 
other significant sources of disease.  This research will critically inform prevention and control 
efforts to reduce sporadic LD incidence. 
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2.6 TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Studies supporting definite rank of environmental sources. 
 
Source Reference Year Location Study 
Population 
Study Design Molecular Subtyping 
Method 
Legionella 
species 
Results Summary 
Potable water 
from high rise 
apartments and 
single family 
homes, work 
places 
[35] 1992 Pennsylvania, 
US 
20 sporadic 
cases 
Case source 
investigations 
Restriction 
endonuclease analysis 
Legionella 
pneumophila 
Source confirmed in 
8(40%) of sporadic cases 
studied.  Home potable 
water should be considered 
more often as a source of 
sporadic disease. 
Construction 
area sink 
[61] 1997 United 
Kingdom 
One 46 year 
old male 
employed at 
construction 
site 
Case Report Pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis  
Legionella 
pneumophila 
Source confirmed at 
construction area where 
patient worked.  Sink 
where patient drank from 
was positive. 
Hot spring [38] 1997 Japan One 71 year 
old female 
Case Report Repetitive element 
polymerase chain 
reaction, arbitrarily 
primed PCR, 
ribotyping, restriction 
endonuclease analysis 
[57], and 
macrorestriction 
endonuclease analysis 
by pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis 
Legionella 
pneumophila 
Hot spring where patient 
almost drowned was 
confirmed as the source.  
Hospital unit where patient 
subsequently stayed was 
negative. 
25 
Source Reference Year Location Study 
Population 
Study Design Molecular Subtyping 
Method 
Legionella 
species 
Results Summary 
High rise 
apartment 
showerhead 
[62] 
2002 
Switzerland One 58 year 
old male 
Case Report Pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis 
Legionella 
pneumophila 
High rise apartment where 
patient lived was 
confirmed as the source.  
Hospital unit where patient 
subsequently stayed was 
negative. 
Car air 
conditioning 
[46] 
2002 
Kentucky, US One 54 year 
old male 
Case Report Heteroduplex analysis Legionella 
pneumophila 
Leaking car air 
conditioning system was 
confirmed as the source.  
The patient had driven for 
a long distance with the 
malfunctioning system. 
Humidifier [63] 
2012 
Israel One Infant 
less than 6 
months 
Case Report Sequence-based typing Legionella 
pneumophila 
Free-standing cold water 
humidifier using domestic 
tap water was confirmed as 
the source. 
Dental unit 
waterline 
[64] 
2012 
Italy One 82 year 
old woman 
Case Report monoclonal antibody 
typing, sequence-
based typing, 
amplified fragment 
length polymorphism 
typing 
Legionella 
pneumophila 
Patient’s home was 
negative and dental office 
cold water as well as the 
high-speed turbine of the 
dental unit waterline were 
positive for L. 
pneumophila. 
Potable water 
from single 
family homes 
and work 
places 
[34]  2015 Netherlands 1484 
sporadic 
cases 
Case source 
investigations 
 
Amplified fragment 
length polymorphism 
genotyping 
Legionella 
pneumophila 
and other 
species 
This study reports the 
results of intensive 
environmental 
investigations and 
confirmed the source in 
41/1484 (3%) of 
investigations. 
Definite rank requires molecular linkage between clinical and environmental isolates. 
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Table 2.2. Studies supporting probable rank of environmental sources. 
 
Source Reference Year Location Study Population Study Design Linkage Method Legionella 
species 
Results Summary 
Potting Soil [56] 2000 United States 3 sporadic cases 
in Pacific 
Northwest 
Case Report Environmental 
and human 
testing, no 
molecular 
linkage 
completed 
Legionella 
longbeachae 
Describes cases of L. 
longbeachae in Oregon, 
Washington, California 
associated with potting soil 
and all had frequent 
gardening exposures.  One 
patient’s potting soil was 
L. longbeachae positive.  
Home spa (24 
hour always 
ready bathing 
system used for 
home birth) 
[65] 2003 Japan 1 infant 4 days old Case Report Environmental 
and human 
testing, no 
molecular 
linkage 
completed 
Legionella 
pneumophila 
Legionella positive water 
from home spa used for 
home birth.  No species 
provided so could not link 
directly to infant's isolate. 
Car air 
conditioning 
[59] 2009 Japan 159 regional 
transportation 
company 
employees and 22 
evaporator 
compartments for 
car air 
conditioners from 
scrap cars 
sampled  
Cross- 
sectional 
Environmental 
sampling and 
human exposure 
survey and 
antibody testing 
Legionella 
pneumophila 
Half of cars positive for 
Legionella but competing 
bacteria prohibited further 
analysis.  Higher antibody 
titers were found in 
individuals reporting car 
air conditioning use. Also 
transportation industry 
workers (all types of 
drivers not just 
commercial) had higher 
prevalence of 
Legionnaires’ disease 
compared to the general 
population in their region.  
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Source Reference Year Location Study Population Study Design Linkage Method Legionella 
species 
Results Summary 
Solar heated 
home hot water 
tank 
[66] 2016 Turkey Two sporadic 
cases 
Case Report Environmental 
and human 
testing, no 
molecular 
linkage 
completed 
Legionella 
pneumophila 
Legionella pneumophila 
found in both clinical and 
environmental isolates of 
home water heated by solar 
panels.  Authors suggest 
water may not get hot 
enough using solar heat. 
Natural Soil [67] 2005 Regional 
Victoria, 
Australia 
Late 40s male Case Report Environmental 
and human 
testing, no 
molecular 
linkage 
completed 
Legionella 
pneumophila 
serogroup 1 
Legionella pneumophila 
serogroup 1 found in both 
clinical isolate and 
environmental isolates 
from plant nursery where 
patient worked.   
Probable rank requires demonstration of Legionella in both clinical and environmental isolates without evidence of molecular linkage. 
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Table 2.3. Studies supporting possible rank of environmental sources. 
 
Source Reference Year Location Study Population Study Design Linkage Method Legionella 
species 
Results Summary 
Residential/  
occupational 
construction site 
exposure, Travel 
[44] 1979 United States 100 sporadic 
cases 
Case-control Statistical L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
Increased risk for smokers, 
drinkers, advanced age, male 
sex, more chronic conditions, 
living near construction, 
being a construction worker, 
recent travel. 
Cooling tower [14] 1991 Scotland 134 sporadic 
cases and 10,159 
lung cancer cases 
Case-control Descriptive spatial 
analysis of 
sporadic cases vs. 
lung cancer cases 
L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
Relative risk of sporadic 
disease was over 3 in people 
living within 0.5 km of a 
cooling tower compared with 
people living more than 1 km 
away.  Dose response was 
observed. 
Cooling tower [68] 1991 Scotland 378 sporadic 
cases 
Epidemiologic 
spatial study 
Ecologic analysis 
of sporadic 
Legionnaires' 
disease rates by 
postal code 
L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
Legionnaires' disease postal 
code rates varied across 
Scotland. If related to home 
water then would expect to 
see more uniform rates across 
geographies but see 
variations which suggests 
cooling towers.  They 
suggest that cooling towers 
are a source of Legionnaires' 
disease in Scotland. 
Non-municipal 
home water, 
travel, home 
plumbing repairs, 
electric vs. gas 
hot water heaters 
[53] 1996 Ohio, US 146 sporadic 
cases matched 
with 146 controls 
Case-control Statistical L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
Non-municipal home water 
supply, smoking, and recent 
residential plumbing repair 
were independent risk factors 
in multivariate regression.  
Travel and electric vs. gas 
water heaters were 
univariately associated. 
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Source Reference Year Location Study Population Study Design Linkage Method Legionella 
species 
Results Summary 
Home potable 
water 
[51] 2003 Nottingham 
UK 
3714 sporadic 
cases 
Epidemiologic 
spatial study 
Spatial cluster 
analysis 
L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
Proximity of residence to a 
cooling tower was not 
identified in this study as a 
risk factor for acquiring 
legionnaires’ disease and no 
clustering of cases to suggest 
an unidentified common 
source was observed. 39% of 
sporadic cases had positive 
homes and this source was 
deemed the likely source. 
Possible rank requires statistical association between cases and source. 
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Table 2.4: Studies supporting suspect rank of environmental sources.  
 
Source Reference Year Location Study Population Study Design Linkage Method Legionella 
species 
Results Summary 
Occupational 
construction site 
exposure, 
Travel 
[42] 1979 Great 
Britain 
84 sporadic cases Descriptive 
case series 
Exposure histories L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
Most cases were older 
men, some traveled, 
mostly resided in cities, 
no occupation stood out 
but some exposed to 
construction, 85% 
smokers, only small 
percentage 
immunosuppressed. 
Construction, 
Travel 
[69] 1981 United 
States 
1005 sporadic 
cases 
Descriptive 
case series 
Exposure histories L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
37% traveled overnight, 
23% lived in site of 
construction, 32% 
exposed to construction, 
they suggest same risk 
factors as outbreaks. 
Healthcare 
occupation, 
construction, 
birds, dentist 
[43] 1981 Iowa, US 30 sporadic cases Descriptive 
case series 
Exposure histories L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
40% of cases were 
employed in healthcare 
and others had 
associations with 
construction and birds.  
They suggest bird 
droppings in cooling 
towers could be a source.  
No active farmers were 
found which was 
unexpected given soil and 
LD connection.  Also 
found association with 
dental extractions. 
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Source Reference Year Location Study Population Study Design Linkage Method Legionella 
species 
Results Summary 
Sinks and 
showerheads in 
high rise 
apartments 
[36] 1985 United 
States 
95 people living 
around the 
University of 
Chicago hospital 
Cross-
sectional 
Environmental 
sampling and 
human (apartment 
residents) 
antibody testing 
Legionella 
pneumophila 
30 (32%) residences were 
positive, median 200 
CFU/mL. Less positives 
with hot water >60C.  No 
association between water 
test result and resident 
antibody level maybe 
because lower 
pathogenicity strains or 
healthier subjects. 
Travel [70] 1990 Italy 42 sporadic cases Descriptive 
case series 
Exposure histories L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
Of the travel associated 
cases studied, 36% were 
sporadic and not 
associated with outbreaks. 
Dental office 
water 
[71] 1995 United 
States 
Environmental 
samples of 28 
dental offices 
Cross-
sectional 
Environmental 
testing only 
L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
Legionella detected in 
68% of water samples 
from dentist offices, but 
also detected in 61% of 
comparable community 
sites.  Dental office 
occupational exposure 
may be of concern. 
Ground water [72] 2004 US and 
Canada 
114 
environmental 
samples of ground 
water and biofilm 
Cross-
sectional 
Environmental 
testing only 
Legionella 
spp. 
Of ground water samples 
tested, 29% and 28% were 
positive by culture and 
PCR respectively.  Found 
in both water and biofilm.  
Hot spring [39] 2007 Taiwan 55 environmental 
samples of 19 hot 
springs 
Cross- 
sectional 
Environmental 
testing only 
L. 
pneumophila 
21% positive but only 
11% positive for L. 
pneumophila.  Authors 
did not conclude that 
immunocompromised 
should not use hot springs, 
but suggested further 
research given their 
limited sample size.   
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Source Reference Year Location Study Population Study Design Linkage Method Legionella 
species 
Results Summary 
Long distance 
driving and car 
air conditioning 
[45] 2007 Turkey 79 long-distance 
male professional 
drivers 
Descriptive 
case series 
Exposure histories 
and antibody 
testing 
L. 
pneumophila 
Bus driver seropositivity 
rate was 19% and 0% for 
driver's assistants.  
Environmental samples 
from air conditioning 
units from buses driven by 
antibody positive bus 
drivers were all negative. 
Home potable 
water 
[54] 2008 Germany 452 
environmental 
samples of home 
water 
Cross-
sectional 
Environmental 
testing only 
L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
Houses with hot water 
storage tanks and 
recirculation were 12% 
Legionella positive but 
ones with instantaneous 
hot water heaters were not 
positive. Water below 
46C were frequently 
positive.  Filters may be 
appropriate in certain 
circumstances. 
Rainwater on 
roads 
[59] 2009 Tokyo, 
Japan 
45 environmental 
samples of 
rainwater 
Cross-
sectional 
Environmental 
testing only 
L. 
pneumophila 
Rainwater was 36% 
positive by culture and 
serogroup 1 detected in 
37% of positives. They 
observed a type of 
amoeba  that can 
resuscitate non-viable 
Legionella and they found 
it in their rain samples.  
Perhaps they were more 
positive but the state of 
legionella were 
unculturable and maybe 
amplify in certain warm, 
sunny weather conditions.   
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Source Reference Year Location Study Population Study Design Linkage Method Legionella 
species 
Results Summary 
Building water 
systems, 
cooling towers 
[41] 2010 Italy 97 sporadic cases 
and 533 potential 
sources 
Cross-
sectional 
Environmental 
testing and 
epidemiologic 
surveillance 
L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
58% of buildings (33% 
community bldgs. such as 
apartments, hotels, 
offices) were positive 1 - 
10 CFU/mL, 32% L. 
pneumophila serogroup 1.  
Water sources tested 
including 1 liter samples 
from fountains, cooling 
towers, and cold and hot 
water supply from various 
sites in the bldg.  
Incidence in certain parts 
of Italy have increased so 
they emphasize the need 
for increased control 
measures. 
Home potable 
water storage 
tanks vs. 
instantaneous 
heaters 
[55] 2011 Singapore 49 environmental 
samples of home 
water tanks and 
instantaneous 
heaters 
Cross- 
sectional 
Environmental 
testing only 
L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
Homes with storage tanks 
were 21% positive, 
instantaneous heaters 3% 
positive but 
concentrations were 
generally under 100 
CFU/mL so the authors 
conclude only moderate 
risk of outbreaks due to 
homes. 
High rise 
apartments 
potable water 
[40] 2012 Hong Kong 77 environmental 
samples of home 
water 
Cross- 
sectional 
Environmental 
testing only 
L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
22% of 77 households 
Legionella positive from 
0.1 to 639 CFU/mL, mean 
~100 CFU/mL.   Higher 
counts in biofilms.   21% 
positive hot water storage 
tanks and 3% positive 
instantaneous heaters.   
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Source Reference Year Location Study Population Study Design Linkage Method Legionella 
species 
Results Summary 
Composting 
facilities 
[73] 2013 Switzerland 88 environmental 
samples of 
compost and 
bioaerosols 
Cross- 
sectional 
Environmental 
testing only 
L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
63% of facilities positive 
for both Legionella and 
FLA, only 6% Legionella 
positive only and 28% 
FLA only.  But only 10% 
of bioaerosol pools 
positive for Legionella. 
Biological 
waste water 
treatment plants 
[74] 2014 Norway 130 
environmental 
samples of 
treatment plants 
Cross- 
sectional 
Environmental 
testing only 
L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
16% positive for 
Legionella, 9% positive 
for L. pneumophila by 
culture.  By PCR, 99% of 
samples were positive for 
Legionella and 46% for L. 
pneumophila. None of the 
strains identified matched 
previous outbreaks. 
Rainwater and 
natural soil 
[58] 2014 Netherlands 97 environmental 
samples of 
rainwater and 
natural soil  
Cross- 
sectional 
Environmental 
testing only 
L. 
pneumophila, 
L. 
longbeachae, 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
30% of soils and 4% of 
rainwater were positive 
for Legionella.  33% of 
soil positives were L. 
pneumophila compared to 
66% of rainwater 
positives.  The authors 
suggest these as 
alternative sources of 
sporadic disease. 
Garden Soil [75] 2016 Netherlands 177 
environmental 
samples of garden 
soil 
Cross- 
sectional 
Environmental 
testing only 
L. 
pneumophila, 
L. 
longbeachae, 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
12% of soil samples were 
positive and of those 32% 
were L. pneumophila. 
Multivariable analysis 
found no soil variables 
significantly associated 
with Legionella positivity. 
None of the sequence-
based types most often 
detected in humans in 
Netherlands were found in 
soil.  They conclude that 
Table 2.4 Continued 
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garden soil is probably not 
the cause of most sporadic 
disease in Netherlands. 
Home showers [76] 2017 United 
Kingdom 
99 environmental 
samples of 82 
home showers 
Cross- 
sectional 
Environmental 
testing only 
L. 
pneumophila 
and other 
Legionella 
spp. 
6% of households were 
Legionella positive. 31% 
positive by PCR.  Risk of 
PCR increased with older 
homes, older showers, and 
the frequency of use.   
Suspect rank requires evidence from environmental prevalence that suggests risk of sporadic Legionnaires’ disease or requires 
evidence from descriptive case series. 
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Figure 2.1 Literature search strategy for sporadic Legionnaires' disease sources. 
PubMed search performed August 9, 2017. 
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3.1 ABSTRACT 
BACKGROUND:   Cooling towers have been linked to outbreak related and non-outbreak 
related legionellosis.  Proper cooling tower maintenance and disinfection are imperative for 
legionellosis prevention but not monitored in Allegheny County, PA, a high incidence area.   
METHODS:   To investigate cooling tower maintenance and Legionella positivity, the 
Allegheny County Health Department (ACHD) performed a survey regarding the presence and 
maintenance of cooling towers and tested cooling towers for Legionella pneumophila.  ACHD 
surveyed healthcare facilities, senior apartment buildings, and county-owned buildings.  
Associations between maintenance practices and Lp were assessed using Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests and multivariable linear regression.   
RESULTS: Of 408 building managers contacted, 377 (92%) completed the survey of which, 
56 (15%) had a cooling tower.  Among 42 cooling towers sampled, 20 (48%) tested positive for 
Lp.  Factors associated with positivity included larger tower capacity, year round usage, hospital 
status and older tower age.  Only cooling tower age was associated with Lp after stepwise 
regression.   
CONCLUSIONS:   Despite maintenance practices, many cooling towers were Lp positive.  
ACHD recommends that facilities develop an ASHRAE compliant water management plan and 
conduct annual basin water emptying, quarterly cleaning, quarterly Legionella testing and 
diligent inspection of older towers.   
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3.2 INTRODUCTION 
Legionnaires’ disease (LD) is the second most common cause of bacterial pneumonia in the 
United States, accounting for 2 – 9 % of community-acquired pneumonia cases [2, 77].  
Developed countries around the globe have experienced an increase in LD incidence since the 
2000s [9-11].  From 2000 to 2014 in the United States, legionellosis incidence, which includes 
LD and the milder, less commonly reported Pontiac Fever, increased 286% from 0.42 to 1.62 
annual cases per 100,000 people [3].  This trend persists even after age-adjustment [9].   
The majority of cases reported in the US and worldwide occur sporadically with no 
identified source [4, 18].  The most common sources are speculated to be home potable water, 
travel-associated potable water, and evaporative cooling towers [16, 22].  Through spatial 
analysis of LD in England and Wales, 20% of sporadic cases were estimated to be attributed to 
cooling towers [22]. 
Transmission of LD occurs through inhalation or aspiration of water containing 
Legionella.  Legionella is a waterborne pathogen found in many aqueous environments and 
proliferates in warm, stagnant water.  Legionella commonly inhabit amoeba as intracellular 
parasites and thrive in biofilms formed on surfaces [2].  Conditions for proliferation are 
commonly found in evaporative cooling towers.  Prevalence of the bacteria in these structures 
has ranged from 2 – 87% and variations exist likely due to sample selection, maintenance 
practices and possibly local cooling tower regulations [78-82].   
Both large and small LD community outbreaks have been caused by cooling towers.  A 
2014 review article described 19 outbreaks attributable to cooling towers with case counts 
ranging from 7 to 449 cases and 6.3% average case fatality rate [83].  A hotel cooling tower in 
the South Bronx neighborhood of New York City caused a 2015 outbreak which sickened 138 
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people and killed 16.  Clinical Legionella isolates matched the strain of Legionella found in the 
cooling tower [25].  In response to this outbreak, both the City and State of New York issued 
regulations requiring cooling tower registration, inspection and Legionella testing [24]. 
In the United States, reported LD incidence has more than doubled since 2000.  US LD 
incidence in 2003 was 0.78 per 100,000 and increased to 1.58 per 100,000 in 2013 [12].  The 
highest incidence of legionellosis in the US consistently occurs in the Mid-Atlantic region.  
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, which is part of this Mid-Atlantic region, experiences rates 
four times higher than the US age-adjusted rate [29].  Over two-thirds of LD cases reported 
annually in Allegheny County are of unknown origin.  These cases are unrelated to outbreaks or 
healthcare facilities.  Cooling tower-related LD has not been identified recently in Allegheny 
County, but has occurred in the past.  Investigating the conditions of cooling towers is an 
important component of LD prevention, especially in an area with a high burden of the disease.  
The purpose of this survey is to assess Legionella prevalence in Allegheny County cooling 
towers and identify areas of improvement for cooling tower maintenance and Legionella 
contamination prevention in Allegheny County.   
3.3 METHODS 
Cooling Tower Maintenance Survey 
Buildings selected for the survey included those that house populations who are susceptible to 
LD. These buildings included hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, assisted living facilities, 
personal care homes and senior apartment buildings identified through Pennsylvania’s 
Department of Health and Department of Human Services.  Allegheny County senior apartment 
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buildings were identified through a Google search using search terms ‘senior apartment AND 
Allegheny county.’  City and county owned buildings in Allegheny County, PA, were also 
surveyed and identified through the Allegheny County Housing Authority, the Housing 
Authority of the City of Pittsburgh, and the Allegheny County Facilities Management 
Department. 
A questionnaire was completed over the phone or sent via email or fax based on facility 
preference.  The questionnaire (Appendix) began with vetting questions to ensure the most 
knowledgeable persons at the facility completed the survey.  Survey questions were based on 
guidelines from the American Society of Heating and Air-Conditioning Engineers [5], the 
Cooling Technology Institute [8] and the World Health Organization (WHO).  Structural 
questions addressed building size, number of cooling towers, cooling tower location, and name 
of water authority.  Maintenance questions addressed use of water treatment professional, 
cooling tower cleaning and inspection procedures, water filtration, basin emptying, biocide 
treatment and monitoring, record keeping, bacterial load testing, and Legionella testing.  Finally, 
facilities were asked to consent to testing by the Allegheny County Health Department (ACHD) 
cooling tower basin water testing for Legionella. 
 
Cooling Tower Sampling 
At consenting facilities, ACHD staff selected a single, random cooling tower for testing if the 
facility had multiple.  The cooling tower’s make, model, serial number, year installed, and size 
(tonnage) were recorded.  Basin water temperature was measured using a digital probe 
thermometer.  Basin water pH was measured using test strips.  Basin water free and total chlorine 
were measured using test strips (range 0 to 10ppm at increments of 0, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 10ppm).  Basin 
water was collected in sterile 125mL plastic bottles.  Bottles were filled to 30mL with basin 
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water and a drop of sterile 0.1 N sodium thiosulfate was added to the bottle immediately after 
water collection using a sterile, disposable, transfer pipette.  Water samples were sent to the 
ACHD Public Health Laboratory on the same day as sample collection.  Water samples were 
stored at 5 ̊ C until processing.   
 
Microbiological Methods 
Water samples were cultured for Legionella pneumophila [84] within four days of collection at 
the ACHD Laboratory.  Each specimen was plated onto GVPC agar directly after acid treatment 
and heat treatment.  Specifically, Legionella Acid Buffer was added to each sample for 15 
minutes at room temperature.  Samples were heat treated at 50°C for 30 minutes using water bath 
before plating.  Plates were incubated at 35°C and read at 3 and 7 days.  Any identified colonies 
were picked and plated on SBA and GVPC agar and incubated overnight at 35°C.  Isolates that 
grew on GVPC agar were tested with Oxoid Legionella Latex Test kit [Oxoid Ltd, Wade Road, 
Basingstoke, Hants, RG24 8PW, UK] and confirmed positive for Lp serogroups 1, 3, 5, 6, Poly 
1-14, or b-m with Direct Fluorescent Antibody test.  [Monoclonal Technologies, Inc. (m-TECH, 
16335 New Bullpen Road, Alpharetta, GA 30004) Rabbit Anti-Legionella IgG Fluorescein 
Labeled].   
 
Whole genome sequencing and phylogenetics 
Genomic DNA was extracted at the University of Pittsburgh, School of Medicine, Infectious 
Disease Epidemiology Research Unit, using the Qiagen DNAeasy Tissue Kit on a QIAcube 
according to manufacturer’s instructions (Qiagen, Germantown, MD). The DNA was eluted in 
10mM Tris/1mm EDTA, and sequenced according to the method of Baym et al. (PMCID: 
4441430) using Illumina Nextera genomic libraries on a MiSeq v2 (500-cycle) kit.  
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Fastq Reads were trimmed and assembled using SPAdes v3.9.0 (PMID: 25422674). 
Assemblies were annotated using Prokka v0.1.1 (PMID: 24642063). The sequencing depth 
ranged from 36X-94X. The assemblies had a median of 96 contigs per sample with an average 
assembly length of 3.7Mbp and an average N50 of 200,000bp. Sequence types (ST) were 
identified using SRST2 (PMID: 25422674). Reads were aligned to reference assembly, LEG551, 
using BWA-MEM v0.7.12-r1039 (http://bio-bwa.sourceforge.net/). For ST2329 pairwise 
comparisons, LEG443 was used as the reference genome. SNPs were identified using GATK 
HaplotypeCaller v3.5 with a ploidy of 1 (PMID: 20644199). SNPs with low mapping quality 
(MQ < 20), strand bias (FS > 60.0), low variant confidence (QD < 2), only seen near the ends of 
reads (ReadPosRankSum < -8.0), or low depth (DP < 5) were filtered using GATK 
VariantFiltration. A phylogenetic tree of aligned SNPs was generated using RAxML v8.2.9 with 
100 bootstrap replicates under the generalized time-reversible model (GTRCAT) and Lewis 
correction for ascertainment bias (PMID: 24451623). Phylogenies were visualized using the 
python package ETE3. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
Descriptive statistics for the sample were presented using either the proportion or median.  The 
outcome variable for this analysis, cooling tower Lp level (colony forming units/mL), was 
analyzed as a continuous variable.  Each predictor variable was coded into two categories. 
Unadjusted analyses were performed to compare the distribution of Lp level between categories 
for each survey variable using Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  Stratification by hospital status was 
employed to examine association among hospital and non-hospital facilities.  A multivariable 
linear regression model was created for the continuous outcome variable.  Log transformation of 
the outcome variable was considered for improved model fit.  Predictors that were univariately 
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associated (p value < 0.1) with Lp level were considered for the multiple regression model using 
a forward stepwise approach with an alpha level=0.05 for entry and remaining in the final model.  
Interaction terms and confounding variables were assessed for inclusion in the final model.  Epi 
Info® 7.1and SAS® 9.4 were used for data management and analysis respectively.   
3.4 RESULTS 
Survey response 
Among 412 facilities approached, 377 (93%) completed the survey.  The response rate by facility 
type ranged from 78% to 100%; the majority of facility types had response rates above 90%.  Of 
those participating facilities, 56 (15%) reported having a cooling tower on the premises (Table 
1).  Hospitals more frequently had cooling towers (78%), followed by skilled nursing facilities 
(20%), and senior apartment buildings (17%).  Very few personal care homes and city or county-
owned buildings had cooling towers (Table 1).     
 
Cooling Tower Sampling 
Of the 56 cooling towers identified, 42 (75%) facilities agreed to ACHD testing.  Lp was 
detected in 20 (48%) cooling tower basin water specimens.  Of 17 hospitals tested, 12 (71%) 
were positive (Table 2). In addition, one (20%) skilled nursing facility, four (36%) senior 
apartment buildings, and three (43%) county-owned buildings were positive.  Neither of the two 
personal care facilities tested were positive.  Of those positive, the median concentration level 
was 35 CFU/mL with a range from 10 – 2,000 CFU/mL.  Lp counts above 100 were found in 
three (12%) hospitals and one (9%) senior apartment building (Table 2).  Of the 19 (95%) 
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isolates assigned a serogroup, 14 (74%) isolates were identified as serogroup 1, 4 (21%) isolates 
were identified as serogroup 5, and one (5%) isolate was identified as serogroup 6.   
 
Survey Results and Univariate Analyses   
Among the 42 facilities with ACHD water testing, the majority of cooling towers had treatment 
programs administered by a water treatment professional, were treated with at least one biocide, 
were tested at least annually for biocide level and Legionella, had an automatic biocide feed, and 
had the tower basin cleaned and emptied of stagnant water at least annually (Table 3).  Only 31% 
of cooling towers were inspected more frequently than monthly.  All cooling towers were 
cleaned at least annually, but only 21% were cleaned greater than twice a year as most cooling 
towers were cleaned at the beginning and the end of the cooling season, which is generally April 
to October.  Only 21% of facilities with a cooling tower had a cooling tower water management 
plan and of those, most qualified as corporate plans (Table 3).  It was difficult to verify whether a 
facility diligently followed a corporate plan that was not developed specifically for their 
tower(s).  Average age of cooling towers was 13 years old, ranging from less than a year to 38 
years (Table 4).  Average tonnage or capacity of the cooling tower was 422 tons, ranging from 
29 to 14,950 tons (Table 4).   
In unadjusted analyses, increased Lp concentration was associated with larger tower 
capacity, year round usage, hospital status, multiple towers, late summer tower sampling, older 
tower age, water management plan existence, and roof location (Tables 3 and 4).  Non-
consequetive water authority supplier (i.e. does not purchase water from another water authority) 
was associated with decreased concentration (Table 3).   
The average cooling tower basin water temperature during ACHD testing was 76̊ F (62 – 
88̊ F).  The average pH during testing was 7 (6 - 11).  Average free and total chlorine levels were 
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< 0.5 ppm (0 – 4 ppm) and < 0.5 ppm (0 -10 ppm) respectively.  None of these water quality 
measurements were significantly associated with Lp concentration (Table 4). 
When stratifying by hospital status, year round usage and older tower age were 
univariately associated with increased concentration in hospital cooling towers, whereas larger 
tower capacity was univariately associated with increased concentration in non-hospital cooling 
towers (Table 5). 
 
Multiple Linear Regression 
Cooling tower age was the only predictor significantly associated with the log transformed Lp 
concentration outcome based on stepwise regression methods.  As cooling tower age increased 
concentration level also increased.  Year round usage and hospital status were included in the 
final model to account for potential confounding between tower age and  Lp level (Table 6).   
 
Whole genome sequencing(WGS) 
WGS was performed on 13 isolates.  Of those, 12 were Lp serogroup 1.  The isolates belong to 
six serotypes (Figure 1). Five isolates belong to ST8 (LEG 322, 349, 507, 551, 590)  and four 
isolates belong to  ST2329 (LEG443, 574, 575, and 588). LEG591 belongs to ST2330, a single 
locus variant of ST8. However, this isolate is unrelated to ST8 isolates having >9,000 SNP 
differences.  ST8 isolates LEG322, 507 and 551 had < 80 SNP differences (Figure 1, Table 7).  
In a pairwise comparison, LEG443 and LEG574 belonging to ST2329 were closely related with 
< 40 SNP differences (Table 8).  Interestingly, three of the ST2329 isolates came from cooling 
towers located within a 1.2 miles of each other.  No geographic clustering was observed between 
the ST8 isolates.  
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3.5 DISCUSSION 
Almost half of Allegheny County cooling towers surveyed were positive for Lp which causes the 
vast majority of LD [9].  The most important indicator of concentration level was cooling tower 
age.  WGS identified 6 different ST with the majority belonging to either ST8 or ST2329, a 
previously undescribed ST.  We observed no apparent geographic clustering.  ST8 is commonly 
found in cooling towers and has been linked to outbreaks internationally, but not in the US [85]. 
Previous studies have found a wide range in the prevalence of Legionella in cooling 
towers outside of outbreak settings.  In international prevalence studies of various sample sizes, 
Legionella contamination ranged from 2% to 100% [78-82, 86].  The concentration ranged from 
< 1 up to 10,000 CFU/mL with most samples under 100 CFU/mL.  Concentration fluctuated over 
time especially in summer months and concentration increased with year round usage [79, 81].  
In the US, 196 cooling towers were sampled nationwide for Legionella in the summer of 2016 
and 84% were PCR positive, while 48% were culture positive.  Half of those culture positive 
towers were positive for Lp serogroup 1 [87]. 
The results of our prevalence survey generally align with previous studies given Lp 
contamination range was broad from 10 to 2,000 CFU/mL and the majority of positive results 
were under 100 CFU/mL.  Nevertheless, the conditions under which prior prevalence studies 
were conducted differ and should be considered.  For example, a prevalence study in New 
Zealand assessed over 1200 cooling towers and only found 2% positive for Legionella.  At the 
time of the study, a cooling tower registry had been in place for several years and the 
government required Legionella testing and reporting of results.  This low prevalence could be 
due in part to strict national cooling tower oversight [80].   
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The concentration of Legionella detected has varied widely in samples collected from 
cooling towers associated with outbreaks.  A 2011 review article summarized 38 cooling tower 
LD outbreak publications and found that 22% of outbreaks were caused by cooling towers with 
levels between 100 – 9,999 CFU/mL, while 13% were between 10,000 – 99,000 CFU/mL [23].  
A 2014 review of 19 cooling tower outbreaks described levels ranging from 10 to 10,000,000 
CFU/mL [83].  The contamination levels we observed were generally lower in comparison to 
these ranges. 
Given this sample of cooling towers in Allegheny County was limited and that the 
majority were healthcare-associated cooling towers, we expected better cooling tower 
maintenance in comparison to a more general sample.  This was confirmed by our finding that 
98% of cooling tower sampled were treated with biocide and all cooling towers were cleaned at 
least annually; however, despite maintenance practices, age was the most important predictor of 
concentration level and Legionella grew even in well maintained systems.  A similar finding 
related to age was documented in a Greek Legionella prevalence study; however, this study 
sampled cooling towers of a wider maintenance scale and found decreased risk of Legionella 
colonization to be associated with biocide treatment, cleaning greater than every 6 months, and 
following a risk management plan. 
Cooling tower LD outbreaks have mostly been attributed to inadequate maintenance such 
as lack of or insufficient biocide treatment and lack of cleaning within 6 months of an outbreak 
[23].  A 2011 cooling tower outbreak review article found that 26% of outbreak-associated 
cooling towers were described as adequately maintained and 66% neglected or inadequately 
maintained [23].  Nevertheless, ‘adequately’ maintained is difficult to define.  Of note, outbreaks 
have also been attributed to ‘well maintained’ cooling towers [88, 89].  Australia and Japan 
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developed guidelines which mandate testing, inspections and registration, yet Australia continues 
to experience cooling tower-associated outbreaks [23].  Overall, cooling tower guidelines 
generally vaguely specify cleaning frequency, biocide type or amount.  Most guidelines 
recommend regular inspections rather than specifying frequency.  Occurrence of outbreaks due 
to ‘adequately maintained’ or ‘well maintained’ cooling towers could be related to guideline 
inconsistencies [23]. 
The availability of a clear and comprehensive cooling tower maintenance guideline 
would be extremely valuable to cooling tower engineering and maintenance personnel.  
Nevertheless, the lack of specificity in current guidelines may be due in part to the variability of 
cooling towers themselves.  The cooling towers we sampled varied greatly in terms of size, age 
and overall operation.  Given these structural differences, creating a clear and comprehensive 
guideline appears difficult. 
In 2015, the American Society of Heating and Air-Conditioning Engineers [5] updated 
their guideline (ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 188-2015) for minimizing Legionella in building 
water systems; the guideline describes minimum expectations for maintenance and development 
of a water management plan to minimize Legionella [21].  These guidelines specify that if a 
building has a cooling tower, the water management plan must address the cooling tower.  Less 
than a quarter of facilities we surveyed had developed a water management plan (Table 3). 
ASHRAE guidelines do not state specific recommendations related to frequency of cleaning, 
inspections or testing [5, 21]; facility managers and their water treatment professional decide 
these specifics.  It is noteworthy that our survey indicated contracting with a water treatment 
professional was associated with decreased concentration level but this finding was not 
statistically significant.  On June 2, 2017, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
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published a memorandum requiring that all hospitals, critical access hospitals and long-term care 
facilities develop a water management plan in compliance with ASHRAE 188-2015.  This may 
increase implementation of water safety and management plans in helathcare facilities. 
For facilities with cooling towers, ACHD published the following recommendations: 1) 
Develop a water management plan, in compliance with ASHRAE 188-2015.  2) Clean cooling 
towers run year round and test for Legionella at least quarterly.  Cooling towers that run 
seasonally should be cleaned and tested for Legionella at least before, during and immediately 
following the cooling season.  3) Collect basin water for routine testing.  4) Clean the basin or 
sump tank and drain as part of routine cleaning.  5) Inspect older cooling towers and clean 
diligently given their potential for Legionella contamination.   
Our study has several limitations that should be considered when interpreting results.  
The first is our limited sample size.  A larger sample size may have improved the robustness of 
our multivariable linear regression model.  We chose to survey buildings that house susceptible 
populations because these populations are disproportionately affected and LD outbreaks have 
been associated with cooling towers on these types of buildings [90].  To increase 
generalizability, we surveyed city and county owned buildings.  External validity should 
nevertheless be considered as the generalizability of these results is suspect.  Also, some of the 
univariate analysis results are not intuitive, such as increased risk associated with water 
management plans.  This is most likely due to our over representation of hospitals.  Hospital 
towers were generally larger and older than non-hospital towers and water management plans 
were more frequently developed by hospitals.  After stratifying by hospital status, we found 
similar univariately associated variables compared to the overall analysis.  The results suggest 
that that the relationship between Legionella and cooling tower year round usage and age was 
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more relevant for hospital cooling towers, whereas tower capacity was more relevant for non-
hospitals.  Nevertheless, power was limited for this stratified analysis. 
Another limitation to consider is survey response accuracy.  We required a maintenance 
supervisor or an engineer to be involved in the completion of the maintenance practice survey; 
however, whether responses reflected true practice was not possible to confirm.  We emphasized 
when conducting the survey over the phone or when sending the survey via email that all 
answers would be kept confidential and no punitive action would be taken based on survey 
response or cooling tower test results.   
Strengths of our study include our overall survey response rate and consent for ACHD 
testing.  All samples were collected by the same ACHD personnel and samples were processed at 
the ACHD public health laboratory rather than commercial labs to ensure consistency of results.  
In Allegheny County, this prevalence study is an important first step towards understanding the 
relationship between cooling towers and LD.   
 
Conclusion 
Cooling towers surveyed in Allegheny County were found to be relatively well maintained in 
comparison to findings from other Legionella prevalence studies and LD outbreak investigations.  
Nevertheless, Lp  was detected in almost half of cooling towers tested.  Improving maintenance 
and reducing Legionella contamination in Allegheny County cooling towers would likely 
contribute to a reduction in the overall burden of disease and potential for cooling tower-
associated outbreaks.   
A detailed cooling tower maintenance guideline would be extremely beneficial for 
Legionella control, although, the creation of such a guideline may not be feasible.  At a 
minimum, ASHRAE Standard 188-2015 should be followed.  An important benefit of this 
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prevalence study was increased contact with local water treatment professionals and facility 
engineers who are tasked with developing maintenance plans.  Many times the facility’s bottom 
line may trump implementation of more intensive cooling tower maintenance practices.  Through 
this health department initiative, ACHD encouraged facilities to comply with ASHRAE Standard 
188-2015 and improve maintenance practices.  Other local and state health departments should 
note this important benefit and consider conducting a cooling tower Legionella prevalence study 
in their jurisdiction as a component of LD prevention efforts. 
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3.6 TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 3.1. Survey and sampling response rate by building type (n = 412), Allegheny County, 
PA, summer 2016. 
 
Facility Type Total Buildings 
Completed 
Survey 
Cooling Tower 
on Premises 
Completed ACHD 
Cooling Tower 
Sampling 
Hospital 27 (7%) 27 (100%) 21 (78%) 15 (71%) 
Skilled Nursing 62 (15%) 60 (97%) 12 (20%) 7 (58%) 
Assisted Living 1 (<1%) 1 (100%) 0 0 
Personal Care 106 (26%) 93 (88%) 3 (3%) 2 (67%) 
Senior Apartment 70 (17%) 65 (93%) 11 (17%) 11 (100%) 
City or County-
Owned Residence 41 (10%) 32 (78%) 0 0 
General County-
Owned Building 100 (24%) 100 (100%) 9* (9%) 7 (78%) 
Total 407 377 (93%) 56 (15%) 42 (75%) 
* Two buildings had cooling towers only operational in the winter months, outside of testing 
window 
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Table 3.2. Legionella pneumophila concentration levels by building type (n = 42), Allegheny 
County, PA, 2016. 
 
 Concentration (CFU/mL)  
 0 1 to 9 10 to 99 100 to 999 1000 + Total 
All Building 
Types 22 (52%) 0 16 (38%) 2 (5%) 2 (5%) 42 
Hospital 5 (29%) 0 9 (53%) 1 (6%) 2 12%) 17 
Skilled Nursing 4 (80%) 0 1 (20%) 0 0 5 
Assisted Living 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Personal Care 2 (100%) 0 0 0 0 2 
Senior Apartment 7 (64%) 0 3 (27%) 1 (9%) 0 11 
City or County-
Owned Residence 0 0 0 0 0 0 
General County-
Owned Building 4 (57%) 0 3 (43%) 0 0 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
Table 3.3. Unadjusted associations between continuous Legionella pneumophila level and dichotomous factors(n = 42),  
Allegheny County, PA, 2016. 
 
  Median and range L. pneumophila contamination level (CFU/mL)  
Variable Count (%) n = 42 Feature Present Feature Absent P-value 
Capacity of Tower > 422 tons 19 (45%) 20 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 90) 0.0003 
Year Round Use 13 (31%) 40 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 100) 0.0015 
Hospital 17 (40%) 20 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 100) 0.0061 
Greater than 1 Cooling Tower onsite 20 (48%) 20 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 100) 0.014 
Non-consecutive Water Authority Surface Water Supply 33 (79%) 0 (0 – 1140) 20 (0 – 2000) 0.021 
August or September ACHD Test compared to June or 
July 19 (45%) 20 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 90) 0.025 
Cooling Tower Age > 13 years old 21 (50%) 20 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 100) 0.057 
Water Management Plan 9 (21%) 20 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 1140) 0.068 
Located on Roof 22 (52%) 20 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 1140) 0.096 
Located on the Ground 17 (40%) 0 (0 – 1140) 20 (0 – 2000) 0.12 
Inspected > Once per Month 13 (31%) 20 (0 – 1140) 0 (0 – 2000) 0.13 
Contract with Water Treatment Provider 38 (90%) 0 (0 – 2000) 50 (0 – 90) 0.14 
Use of Drift Eliminator 23 (55%) 0 (0 – 600) 10 (0 – 2000) 0.15 
Legionella Test ≥ Annually 22 (52%) 20 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 100) 0.15 
Use of Both Oxidizing and Non-Oxidizing Disinfectant 17 (40%) 20 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 100) 0.22 
Tower cleaned > Twice Annually 9 (21%) 0 (0 – 40) 10 (0 – 2000) 0.25 
Direct or Open Circuit System 28 (67%) 10 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 70) 0.25 
Basin Emptying ≥ Annually 28 (67%) 0 (0 – 90) 10 (0 – 2000) 0.25 
Use of Non-Oxidizing Disinfectant Only 5 (12%) 0 (0 – 70) 10 (0 – 2000) 0.33 
Protected from Sunlight 6 (14%) 30 (0 – 70) 0 (0 – 2000) 0.33 
Regular Basin Cleaning 39 (93%) 0 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 10) 0.38 
Seasonal Chloramination by Water Authority 11 (26%) 0 (0 – 40) 0 (0 – 2000) 0.43 
Maintenance and Testing Records Kept 38 (90%) 5 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 40) 0.44 
Use of Oxidizing Disinfectant Only 12 (29%) 15 (0 – 100) 0 (0 – 2000) 0.45 
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Variable Count (%) n = 42 Feature Present Feature Absent P-value 
Test for Bacteria ≥ Annually 34 (81%) 0 (0 – 2000) 15 (0 – 90) 0.51 
Year Round Chloramination by Water Authority 11 (26%) 10 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 1140) 0.66 
Water Filtration 17 (40%) 10 (0 – 1140) 0 (0 – 2000) 0.7 
Automatic Biocide Feed 36 (86%) 0 (0 – 2000) 5 (0 – 40) 0.75 
Free Chlorine Used by Water Authority 20 (48%) 0 (0 – 1140) 5 (0 – 2000) 0.76 
Basin Water Temperature > 77 ̊F 16 (38%) 5 (0 – 600) 0 (0 – 2000) 0.84 
Basin Water pH > 7 3 (7%) 0 (0 – 90) 0 (0 – 2000) 0.86 
Test for Biocide Routinely 27 (64%) 0 (0 – 2000) 0 (0 – 70) 0.89 
 Table 3.3 Continued 
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Table 3.4. Unadjusted associations between continuous Legionella pneumophila level 
and continuous factors (n=42), Allegheny County, PA, 2016. 
 
Variable Count or Mean (% or range) n = 42 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Confidence 
Interval P-value 
Cooling Tower Age (years) 13 (38 – < 1 year) 20.5 6.8, 34.1 0.0043 
Number of Towers Onsite 2 (1 – 6) 83.4 7.2, 159.7 0.033 
ACHD Sampling Month July (June – September) 62.9 -42.8, 168.7 0.24 
Basin Water Temperature ( ̊F) 77 (62 – 88) 5.7 -15.4, 26.8 0.59 
Basin Water Total Chlorine 
Level (ppm)  <0.5 (0 – 10) -13.7 -88.2, 60.8 0.71 
Basin Water Free Chlorine 
Level (ppm) < 0.5 (0 – 4) -23.0 -212.7, 166.7 0.81 
Capacity of Tower (tons) 422 (29 - 17950) 0.004 -0.04, 0.05 0.82 
Basin Water pH 7.0 (6 - 11) 1.4 -152.7, 155.5 0.99 
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Table 3.5. Significant unadjusted associations with Legionella pneumophila level stratified by 
hospital status. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6. Multivariable linear regression model of independent factors and log-transformed 
Legionella pneumophila continuous outcome. 
 
Independent Predictor Inclusion Criteria Coefficient Confidence Interval P-value 
Cooling Tower Age Independent predictor after stepwise procedure 0.07 0.006, 0.1 0.03 
Year round usage Confounder between tower age and outcome 0.6 -0.4, 1.6 0.2 
Hospital status Confounder between tower age and outcome -0.6 -1.8, 0.6 0.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Count (%) n = 17 
Feature 
Present 
Feature 
Absent 
P-
value 
Hospitals (n=17)     
Year Round Use 10 (59%) 60 (0 to 2000) 0 (0 to 40) 0.014 
Cooling Tower Age > 13 years old 12 (71%) 50 (0 to 2000) 0 (0 to 20) 0.038 
Non-hospitals (n=23)     
Capacity of Tower > 422 tons 7 (28%) 10 (0 to 100) 0 (0 to 70) 0.0098 
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Table 3.7. Pairwise SNP differences among 13 serogroup 1 L. pneumophila isolates using LEG551 as reference genome. 
 
LEG551 LEG507 LEG322 LEG590 LEG349 LEG591 LEG444 LEG508 LEG589 LEG441 LEG574 LEG588 LEG575 LEG443 
LEG551 0 46 80 1132 2895 9295 14339 19729 23481 72682 184434 184600 186239 186832 
LEG507 
 
0 57 1110 2879 9262 11652 19640 21099 70670 184328 183338 184977 186615 
LEG322 
  
0 1157 2919 9304 11665 19677 21151 70702 184380 183389 185033 186710 
LEG590 
   
0 1818 10360 11666 20013 21466 70517 184017 183033 184690 186300 
LEG349 
    
0 9795 11685 21752 23205 71761 182183 181266 182879 184474 
LEG591 
     
0 10528 25695 27973 73999 173203 173409 174160 175491 
LEG444 
      
0 12331 14057 16769 23116 23733 24558 23160 
LEG508 
       
0 1998 68029 177310 177875 178033 178962 
LEG589 
        
0 69156 177032 178793 179230 178547 
LEG441 
         
0 179130 180010 181095 180368 
LEG574 
          
0 1897 2176 485 
LEG588 
           
0 1480 3778 
LEG575 
            
0 2135 
LEG443 
             
0 
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Table 3.8. Pairwise SNP differences among 4 ST2329 isolates using LEG443 as 
reference genome. 
 
  LEG443 LEG574 LEG575 LEG588 
LEG443 0 38 1330 4257 
LEG574 
 
0 1144 1247 
LEG575 
  
0 400 
LEG588 
   
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Phylogeny of 13 serogroup 1 L. pneumophila genomes based on aligned SNPs to 
reference assembly, LEG551.  
 
Scale represents mean number of nucleotide substitutions per site. Sequence type (ST). 
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4.1 ABSTRACT 
BACKGROUND: Legionnaires’ disease (LD) outbreaks cause considerable morbidity and 
mortality.  Health departments are tasked with detecting these outbreaks quickly to identify the 
source and prevent further transmission.  The objective of this study is to determine the 
adaptability, utility and performance of an LD cluster detection system first used by the New 
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene through a prospective simulation in 
Allegheny County, PA.   
METHODS: Three simulated LD outbreaks were generated based on data from actual 
outbreaks published in the literature. Simulated cases were imbedded in actual Allegheny County 
baseline 2014 – 2016 surveillance data using a simulated report date.  SAS (v.9.4) and SaTScan 
(v.9.4.4) were used to mimic daily analyses using the prospective space-time permutation scan 
statistic.  Analyses with 30-day and 180-day maximum temporal windows were conducted.  The 
result of each daily analysis was categorized as either detecting a true positive cluster, a false 
positive cluster, a false negative cluster or a true negative cluster based on 20-day, 100-day and 
365-day recurrence intervals.  Validity statistics as well as time to detection were calculated.   
RESULTS: Two large, simulated cooling tower-associated outbreaks were detected, whereas a 
small, simulated potable water-associated outbreak was not detected. 
CONCLUSIONS: Health departments should consider adopting this cluster detection method 
for improved LD outbreak detection, faster investigation initiation and potential disease 
prevention. 
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4.2 INTRODUCTION 
Legionnaires’ disease (LD) is a pneumonia caused by Legionella bacteria that disproportionately 
affects elderly and immunocompromised persons and can lead to death [2].  LD is the second 
most common form of bacterial pneumonia in the US. Transmission occurs primarily through 
inhalation of aerosolized droplets from a contaminated water source.  Known sources include 
large building water systems, cooling towers, soil, hot tubs and residential potable water systems 
[2].   
In the US, only 4% of LD cases have been shown to be outbreak-associated  [9].  
Allegheny County, PA, which includes Pittsburgh and the surrounding suburbs, experiences LD 
rates four-times higher than the national rate [29].  The majority of these cases are sporadic or 
non-outbreak associated.  At the Allegheny County Health Department (ACHD), as in many 
other health departments, staff routinely conducts patient interviews to identify risk factors and 
then review collected data to assess common exposures among cases. Detecting clusters without 
using statistical analyses relies on astute staff recognizing links between cases and can take days 
to weeks after cases begin to be reported.   
Through both prospective and retrospective methods, statistical cluster detection has been 
shown to successfully identify LD outbreaks quickly and accurately.  Sansom et al. fit a Poisson 
distribution-based model which estimates the strength of association between cases based on 
location and timing of infection [91].  A cluster size of three provided the best combination of 
higher sensitivity and lower false alarm rate.  This method was validated using UK historical 
outbreak and non-outbreak associated cases and relied on the availability of population data to fit 
the model which is often difficult to ascertain [91]. 
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Another cluster detection method demonstrated in the Netherlands utilized the software 
SaTScanTM [27].  The investigators conducted simulated prospective weekly and daily analyses 
using the space-time permutation scan statistic [26] to detect lower respiratory tract outbreaks in 
seven years of Dutch lower respiratory tract infection syndromic surveillance data [92].  An 
advantage of using the scan statistic method is that it does not require population-at-risk data for 
the analysis.  The scan statistic uses cylinders to analyze the data in space and time, with the 
circle representing space and the height representing time.   
This method was validated using data from two large Dutch community-acquired LD 
outbreaks.  The first outbreak involved 188 cases and was associated with a hot tub at a Dutch 
flower show [93].  The second outbreak involved 30 cases and was associated with a cooling 
tower [94].  These outbreaks were detected by this cluster detection program 2 and 3 days before 
public health practitioners noticed an increase in cases.  This suggests that spatiotemporal 
analyses for syndromic surveillance are useful if epidemiologic and microbiological data are 
available as a supplement [92]. 
A prospective spatiotemporal analysis is performed daily by the New York City 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) to detect clusters of reportable infectious 
disease conditions.  DOHMH used the space-time permutation scan statistic in SaTScanTM to 
conduct daily analyses of 35 reportable infectious disease conditions, including LD [28].  The 
maximum geographical cluster size is set at half of all cases and the maximum temporal window 
is set at 30 days for most conditions.  A signal is created when the recurrence interval (RI) for an 
identified cluster exceeds a pre-specified RI threshold. The RI is defined as the number of days 
of analyses required in order to expect the number of clusters at least as unlikely as the observed 
cluster to be equal to 1 by chance alone.  Several LD outbreaks have been detected using the 
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DOHMHM method since its inception in 2014, including the nation’s second largest community-
acquired outbreak which was caused by a South Bronx hotel cooling tower [28].  In this instance, 
the DOHMH SaTScanTM cluster detection method detected a significant cluster before any 
individual noticed an increase in cases. 
Only one community-acquired LD outbreak occurring in 2008 has been identified in 
Allegheny County in the past decade.  Traditional patient interview-based surveillance methods 
have not identified common exposures amongst community-acquired Allegheny County LD 
cases.  Clusters of seemingly sporadic cases could go undetected as sources such as cooling 
towers are difficult to identify with surveillance methods that rely on human review and 
descriptive epidemiology.  More timely detection would lead to faster outbreak investigation, 
source mitigation and disease prevention.  The objective of this study is to determine the 
adaptability, utility and performance of DOHMH’s SaTScan cluster detection method for LD 
outbreak detection through a prospective simulation in Allegheny County.   
4.3 METHODS 
Data on legionellosis cases reported in Allegheny County in 2014 - 2016 were obtained through 
Pennsylvania’s National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (PA-NEDSS).  Date of report 
and latitude and longitude coordinates of residence were used to represent cases.  Legionellosis 
is comprised of two conditions caused by Legionella bacteria: LD and Pontiac fever, which is a 
milder febrile illness and therefore less commonly diagnosed and reported.  A confirmed case of 
legionellosis is defined by the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists as a clinically 
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compatible illness confirmed by laboratory culture, urine antigen or antibody seroconversion 
[95].   
Three simulated outbreaks were created based on data published on community-acquired 
LD outbreak investigations [96-98].  These three simulated outbreaks were created because they 
represent three distinct LD community-acquired outbreak types that could potentially be detected 
by this cluster detection method: 1) a fast-growing cooling tower-associated LD outbreak, 2) a 
moderate-growing cooling tower-associated LD outbreak, and 3) a slow-growing potable water 
distribution system-associated LD outbreak.  The outbreaks varied by environmental source, 
number of cases, duration, growth of epidemic curve, radius of affected area, and season (Table 
1).  The specific published outbreak investigations used to create the simulations were chosen in 
part because the population size of the affected area was relatively similar to Allegheny County’s 
1.2 million people (Table 1) [99].  The cases from each individual outbreak were inserted into 
Allegheny County baseline data based on a simulated report date to mimic the published 
epidemic curve.  An epidemic curve for simulated outbreak 3 was not available in the published 
manuscript [98]; however, this outbreak investigation was the only published community-
acquired potable water LD outbreak identified through a PubMed search on October 24, 2017.  
Information from the manuscript was used to estimate an epidemic curve.  
Each published outbreak used for a simulation included a point map of case spatial 
distributions. For each simulated outbreak we mimicked the published outbreak spatial 
distribution by calculating the distribution of published outbreak cases within circular bands of 
increasing radius centered on the outbreak source, and then assigning locations to simulated 
outbreak cases to achieve the same distribution relative to the simulated outbreak area.  We also 
recreated the visual density of cases immediately surrounding the simulated outbreak source.  
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The published manuscript used as the basis for simulated outbreak 2 also included the spatial 
distribution of cases during two time periods.  We used this information to further refine the case 
spatial distribution of simulated outbreak 2.  Only home addresses were simulated and included 
in this analysis.   
We analyzed the simulated study data for Allegheny County, which included baseline or 
routine public health surveillance data spiked with simulated outbreak cases, using a SAS 
program created by DOHMH [28], modified for use by ACHD.  The original DOHMH SAS 
program was easily modified by an ACHD epidemiologist with intermediate SAS skills.  Minor 
modifications included editing portions of the original code to conform to PA-NEDSS-specific 
nuances, removing code related to secondary addresses, and editing portions of the code that 
reference NYC-specific boroughs and United Hospital Fund (UHF) neighborhoods [28].    The 
DOHMH standard maximum spatial cluster size of 50% of all cases reported during the study 
period was used for this analysis.  The maximum temporal cluster size chosen for each simulated 
outbreak analysis was determined by the time span of each simulated outbreak epidemic curve 
(Table 1).  A 30 day and 180 day maximum temporal cluster size has been used to detect rapidly 
and slowly accelerating LD outbreaks, respectively [28].  Simulated outbreak 2 was analyzed 
with both 30 and 180 day maximum temporal windows as the epidemic curve was not clearly 
either fast or slow-growing.  The maximum temporal cluster sizes of 30 and 180 days require 
365 and 730 days of historical baseline data, respectively.  A test statistic and p-value was 
calculated for each cylinder to determine whether an observed cluster in the cylinder during the 
specified time period was due to chance.  The RI for a given cluster was calculated by taking the 
reciprocal of the p-value for the associated cylinder.   
70 
We assessed 2014 – 2016 Allegheny County legionellosis case reports for previously 
unidentified true clusters through a retrospective analysis using the space-time permutation scan 
statistic in SaTScanTM.  These years were analyzed given they represented baseline years for 
prospective analyses.  For each of the three LD outbreak types, we spiked the 2016 baseline data 
with a simulated outbreak.  The 2016 data with each of the three outbreaks were analyzed 
separately one time.  We mimicked daily prospective analyses for the entire year of 2016 using 
three RI thresholds: 20, 100, and 365 days.  Analysis days were restricted to days in which a 
baseline or simulated case was reported given the potential for cluster signaling.  Analysis days 
with at least one cluster exceeding the RI threshold were classified as positive, while analysis 
days with no clusters exceeding the RI threshold were classified as negative. The results of a 
daily analysis were considered to be true positive if 1) RI ≥ threshold assigned and 2) ≥ 3 
simulated cases included in cluster detected.  The results of a daily analysis were considered to 
be false positive if 1) RI ≥ threshold assigned and 2) < 3 simulated cases included in cluster 
detected.  The results of a daily analysis were considered to be true negative if 1) RI < threshold 
assigned and 2) < 3 simulated cases were reported in maximum temporal window.  Finally, the 
results of a daily analysis were considered to be false negative if 1) RI < threshold assigned, 2) ≥ 
3 simulated cases were reported in maximum temporal window and 3) ≥ 1 simulated case was 
reported that day. 
These daily analysis assignments, based on the three RI thresholds, were used to calculate 
the validity statistics of sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value (PPV) and negative 
predictive value (NPV) for each simulated outbreak.  Sensitivity was defined as the proportion of 
true positive daily analyses amongst all daily analyses that should have signaled a cluster.  
Specificity was defined as the proportion of true negative daily analyses amongst all daily 
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analyses that should not have signaled a cluster.  PPV was defined as the proportion of true 
positive daily analyses amongst all signaled daily analyses.  NPV was defined as the proportion 
of the true negative daily analyses amongst all non-signaled daily analyses. 
Time to outbreak detection was calculated for each simulated outbreak by subtracting the 
earliest outbreak detection date from the report date of the third simulated outbreak-associated 
case.  All analyses were performed using SAS (v.9.4) and SaTScanTM (v.9.4.4). 
4.4 RESULTS 
During 2006–2016, the observed number of LD cases reported per year in Allegheny County 
ranged between 54 and 118, and 90 cases were reported in 2016 (Figure 1).  When 
retrospectively analyzing these 2014 – 2016 Allegheny County LD surveillance data, no clusters 
were detected.   
A total of 144 outbreak cases were added as part of three separate outbreak simulations 
(Figure 2, 3).  The shortest time to detection was 1 day for outbreak 1 and 22 days for outbreak 
2; however, simulated outbreak 3 was not detected (Table 2).  Time to detection was shortened 
by using a lower RI threshold for all three simulated outbreaks.  Time to detection was shortened 
for simulated outbreak 2 when a 30 day maximum temporal window was used (Table 2).   
Using a 30 day maximum temporal window and an RI signaling threshold ≥20 days or 
≥100 days, all validity statistics for simulated outbreak 1 detection were ≥90%, thus few false 
negative and false positive days were produced (Table 3).  Using a 30 day maximum temporal 
window, the sensitivity of simulated outbreak 2 detection was low using a RI ≥20 days threshold 
and very low using a RI ≥100 day threshold, whereas all other validity statistics were ≥64% 
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(Table 4).  When using a 180 day maximum temporal window and either RI signaling threshold, 
sensitivity of simulated outbreak 2 detection was ≥43%.  The other validity statistics were ≥76% 
(Table 4).  Using a 180 day maximum temporal window and either RI signaling threshold, 
outbreak 3 was not detected, so sensitivity was 0% and specificity was 100% (Table 5).   
4.5 DISCUSSION 
In this study, the DOHMH SaTScan cluster detection method successfully identified two larger, 
more explosive simulated outbreaks and failed to detect one smaller, slow-growing simulated 
outbreak.  The simulated outbreaks analyzed were based on outbreaks that occurred in locations 
with comparable population sizes to Allegheny County; however, Allegheny County’s 
underlying LD burden is most likely elevated in comparison.  One might expect outbreak 
clusters to be more difficult to detect in areas with a high LD incidence; however, large 
outbreaks like simulated outbreaks 1 and 2 would be difficult to miss given the large number of 
cases.  Both outbreaks were detected relatively quickly.  The improved validity statistics of the 
second simulation demonstrate the utility of using the 180 day maximum temporal window, 
while the 30 day maximum temporal window was more appropriate for the first simulation. Both 
simulated outbreaks 1 and 2 were based on cooling tower outbreaks.  Cooling tower outbreaks 
can be difficult to quickly detect through human review given patients are often unaware of 
cooling tower exposures.   
In 2015, the DOHMH SaTScan cluster detection method detected a cluster with an RI of 
500 days which included eight cases centered on the South Bronx.  This cluster was identified 
three days before BCD staff independently noted an increase in LD cases, and four days before 
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staff from a South Bronx hospital notified DOHMH of an increase in LD among emergency 
department patients [28].  Resource-intensive methods such as patient interviews, multi-focused 
cluster tests for cooling tower sampling prioritization, and extensive environmental sampling 
were employed to identify the cooling tower source [19].  The DOHMH SaTScan cluster 
detection method significantly contributed to the timeliness of the outbreak investigation and 
mitigation and was useful for tracking the scope of the outbreak after initial detection, as 
additional cases were reported. 
The scan statistic is advantageous for prospective infectious disease cluster detection 
because it scans across all possible spatial and temporal boundaries within specifications, does 
not require population-at-risk, and accounts for the problem of multiple testing when analyzing 
closely overlapping spatial areas and time windows [26].  This method most successfully detects 
outbreaks that are highly focal and are circular in shape, such as LD cooling tower-related 
outbreaks, given the scanning window cylinder is circular.  Nevertheless, non-circular shaped 
outbreaks have been successfully detected by this method [100].  Previously, the effectiveness of 
the scan statistic for cluster detection was demonstrated through analysis of West Nile dead bird 
surveillance, hospital emergency department syndromic surveillance, ambulance dispatch call 
surveillance, pharmacy sales data, shigellosis surveillance, and campylobacteriosis surveillance 
[26, 100-105]. 
Simulated outbreak 3 was not detected, as it occurred over a longer time period and 
included few cases. The frequency of this type of local potable water LD outbreak is unknown.  
If these types of outbreaks do occur regularly, they most likely go undetected.  This type of 
outbreak may not be detected through other surveillance methods, although the ACHD public 
health nurses who conduct patient interviews might notice the proximity of residential addresses. 
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Additional analyses could be automated to identify multiple cases within a defined period 
sharing a common potable water source [106].   
Health departments should consider adopting this SaTScanTM method for LD cluster 
detection.  For optimized sensitivity and PPV, daily analyses should be run simultaneously using 
both a 30 and 180 day maximum temporal window and a high RI threshold, such as 100 days.  
This cluster detection method should be considered by health departments especially for 
detection of cooling tower-associated LD outbreaks.  This method could also reinforce 
spatiotemporal trends observed by public health investigators and provide additional evidence to 
support the need for further investigation.  Each simulated outbreak was detected more quickly 
using an RI threshold of 20 days; however, more false positives were produced with this 
threshold that could overextend limited public health resources.  Detecting a significant cluster 
using this method should initiate an investigation of a potential source including enhanced 
patient interviews and environmental sampling.  Adopting this cluster detection method for LD 
outbreak detection is also advantageous for health departments given additional conditions could 
be analyzed using this method. 
This simulation method has several limitations.  First, PA-NEDSS case report date was 
the only date simulated to mimic the published epidemic curve, rather than onset or diagnosis 
date, which are more meaningful epidemiologically, but more difficult to simulate based on 
published data available. In actuality, report dates might not have the same temporal pattern as 
onset or diagnosis dates. Report dates and can also be delayed because of batch electronic 
reporting, increasing the time to outbreak detection. 
Second, residential address was the only address simulated for each case.  DOHMH also 
analyzes work address when available which improves sensitivity for detecting clusters where a 
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patient’s exposure occurred near his or her worksite but not residence.  At this time, PA-NEDSS 
does not include data on work address in a systematic way, thus this analysis reflects the current 
limitations of PA-NEDSS.  Most likely, other health departments are similarly limited in case 
address availability.  Each publication utilized to simulate outbreaks described case spatial 
distributions based solely on residential address.   
Third, daily analyses were simulated only over one year.  Results may vary if this daily 
analysis simulation were repeated over several years given fluctuation in baseline Allegheny 
County LD case counts.  Only three simulated outbreaks were generated for this analysis.  These 
three types were chosen because they represent three distinct types of community-acquired LD 
outbreaks.  Many simulations of one outbreak type could have been generated with parameter 
specifications; however, we chose to simulate one outbreak of each type as accurately as possible 
based on information available through the publication including spatial distribution and 
epidemic curve.  Information about the epidemic curve of simulated outbreak 3 was limited.   
The method used to simulate the spatial distribution of each outbreak is novel and has 
limitations.  The outbreaks used for simulation occurred outside of Allegheny County in 
jurisdictions that differ from Allegheny County in many ways.  Creation of these simulations 
required making assumptions about the spatial distribution of cases that in actuality may take a 
different form because of differences in Allegheny County population density and distribution, 
topography, and wind patterns. Also, we did not take into account area-based poverty when 
considering the spatial distribution of simulated cases.  This may have affected our ability to 
detect increases in case counts relative to baseline LD.  
Finally, these findings might not be fully generalizable to jurisdictions with low LD 
incidence.  It may be more difficult to detect clusters in Allegheny County than in other locations 
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with lower baseline case counts.  Detection of smaller outbreaks like simulated outbreak 3 is 
certainly difficult in Allegheny County and may perhaps be easier in locations with lower 
baseline case counts. 
 
Conclusion 
This cluster detection method was easily adapted for use in Allegheny County and will continue 
to be used for prospective LD cluster detection going forward.  This method quickly detected 
simulated cooling tower-related outbreaks that otherwise might have required more time to 
detect by surveillance methods that rely on human review of descriptive case epidemiology, 
given cases are unaware of exposures.  A smaller, more slow-growing potable water outbreak 
was not detected using this method.  Nevertheless, health departments should consider utilizing 
this cluster detection method for improved LD outbreak detection and potential disease 
prevention.    
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4.6 TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 4.1. Legionnaires’ disease simulated outbreak characteristics based on published outbreak investigations. 
 
Outbreak 
Simulation 
Outbreak 
Location 
Population 
size 
Case 
Count 
Duration Rapid/Slow 
Growth 
Maximum 
Temporal 
Cluster Size 
Environmental 
Source 
Outbreak 
radius 
Season 
# 1 [96] Edinburgh, 
Scotland 
495,360 50 38 days Rapid 30 day Cooling tower 6 miles Early 
summer 
# 2 [97] Pas-de-Calais, 
France 
1,452,590 84 82 days Moderate 30 day, 180 day Cooling tower 3.75 miles Fall 
# 3[98] New Jersey, 
exact location 
not disclosed 
n/a 10 163 Slow 180 day Potable water 1 mile Summer 
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Table 4.2. Days from third outbreak-associated case report to outbreak detection for three 
simulated Legionnaires’ disease outbreaks, Allegheny County, 2016. 
 
 30 day max temporal window 180 day max temporal window 
 RI ≥20 RI ≥100 RI ≥365 RI ≥20 RI ≥100 RI ≥365 
Outbreak simulation 1 1 day 5 day 5 days n/a n/a n/a 
Outbreak simulation 2 22 days 38 days Not detected 33 days 33 days 36 days 
Outbreak simulation 3 n/a n/a n/a Not detected 
Not 
detected Not detected 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. Simulated outbreak 1 daily analyses validity statistics (n = 105 days). 
 30 day max temporal window 
 RI ≥20 RI ≥100 RI ≥365 
Sensitivity 100% 95.2% 90.4% 
Specificity 98.8% 100% 100% 
Positive Predictive Value 95.4% 100% 100% 
Negative Predictive Value 100% 98.8% 97.7% 
Represents proportions of total days in which no baseline  
and/or simulated case(s) were reported were not analyzed 
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Table 4.4. Simulated outbreak 2 daily analyses validity statistics (n = 125 days). 
 30 day max temporal window 180 day max temporal window 
 RI ≥20 RI ≥100 RI ≥365 RI ≥20 RI ≥100 RI ≥365 
Sensitivity 29.5% 6.8% 0% 50.0% 50.0% 43..2% 
Specificity 98.8% 100% 100% 98.8% 98.8% 98.8% 
Positive Predictive 
Value 
92.9% 100% Undefined 95.7% 95.7% 95.0% 
Negative 
Predictive Value 
72.1% 66.4% 64.8% 78.5% 78.5% 76.2% 
Represents proportions of total days in which no baseline and/or simulated case(s) were    
reported were not analyzed 
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Table 4.5. Simulated outbreak 3 daily analyses validity statistics (n = 94 days). 
 180 day max temporal window 
 RI ≥20 RI ≥100 RI ≥365 
Sensitivity 0% 0% 0% 
Specificity 97.7% 100% 100% 
Positive Predictive Value 0% Undefined Undefined 
Negative Predictive Value 91.3% 91.5% 91.5% 
Represents proportions of total days in which no baseline  
and/or simulated case(s) were reported were not analyzed 
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Figure 4.1. Confirmed legionellosis cases and age-adjusted legionellosis incidence rates, 
Allegheny County, PA, 2006-2016. 
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Figure 4.2. Observed baseline and simulated outbreak-associated legionellosis cases, Allegheny County, PA, 2016. 
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Figure 4.3. Simulated outbreak- associated Legionnaires’ disease cases and simulated outbreak buffers, Allegheny County, PA. 
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5.0  DISSERTATION DISCUSSION 
5.1 MAJOR FINDINGS 
Sporadic LD is a disease of relatively high morbidity and mortality, yet epidemiologic research 
on the subject is lacking.  This dissertation aimed to improve our understanding of sporadic LD 
epidemiology and suggests means for LD incidence reduction through three complementary 
studies.  The first explores the sources of sporadic LD and suggests directions of future research.  
The second assesses cooling towers as a source of sporadic and outbreak-associated LD and 
provides recommendations to prevent Legionella contamination and thus LD transmission.  
Finally, the third assesses the adaptability, performance and utility of a cluster detection program 
that could aid in identifying relatedness among seemingly sporadic LD cases, leading to 
identification environmental sources and prompt remediation to prevent LD transmission. 
The literature review presented in chapter two of this dissertation highlighted gaps in our 
understanding of the significant environmental sources of sporadic LD.  Based on the limited 
literature available, significant sources included residential potable water, motor vehicle travel, 
and large building water systems.  Source significance was determined through evidence of 
environmental source and case linkage as well as Legionella bacteria found in the environmental 
source to which vulnerable populations could be exposed.  Cooling towers may also be a 
significant source of sporadic LD, but linkage between cooling towers and sporadic LD is 
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difficult.  Ultimately, we found that the source of the majority of sporadic LD is not determined 
given the many limitations of environmental source investigations. 
The results of the cooling tower Legionella prevalence study are presented in chapter 
three of this dissertation.  Almost half of Allegheny County cooling towers sampled were 
positive for L. pneumophila.  L. pneumophila concentration level was positively associated with 
cooling tower age, larger tower capacity, year round usage and hospital status.  Cooling tower 
age was the most important predictor of L. pneumophila concentration level.  ACHD issued 
recommendations to building managers in response to these results including a recommendation 
to develop a water management plan and to conduct annual basin emptying, quarterly cleaning, 
quarterly Legionella testing and diligent inspection of older towers. 
Finally, the results of the LD cluster detection simulation are presented in chapter four of 
this dissertation.  In general, the cluster detection method was relatively adaptable for a local 
health department with moderate informatics capabilities.  Larger, cooling tower-associated 
outbreaks were quickly detected, whereas a smaller, potable water-associated outbreak was not 
detected.  Health departments should consider adopting this method for improved LD outbreak 
detection, faster investigation initiation and potential disease prevention. 
5.2 PUBLIC HEALTH SIGNIFICANCE 
Health departments are tasked with protecting the public health of their citizens.  Often health 
department financial and personnel resources are limited must be used efficiently.  LD is a 
devastating and costly disease that is difficult to control given the exact source is often hard to 
pinpoint.  Nevertheless, it is also a disease of public interest and concern, especially during an 
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outbreak.  Health department resources should be allocated to LD prevention measures to 
preempt outbreaks and increase cost-efficiency as well as reduce overall LD incidence.   
The results of three complementary studies described in this dissertation inform locally-
focused intervention strategies for LD prevention.  The environmental sources of sporadic LD as 
described in chapter two should be considered potential targets for preemptive interventions.  An 
example of such an intervention is provided by the Allegheny County cooling tower Legionella 
prevalence study as described in chapter three.  Finally, chapter four describes a spatiotemporal 
method for efficient outbreak detection that should be considered for local implementation.  This 
method could relate seemingly sporadic cases to an environmental source and contribute to faster 
outbreak detection and disease prevention.  
LD prevention is especially important in Allegheny County given high LD incidence.  
The topic of this dissertation was selected based on the needs of ACHD.  Resources for LD 
prevention in Allegheny County are limited and have historically been directed towards 
healthcare-associated LD prevention.  In recent years, healthcare-associated LD has been a focus 
of public attention in Allegheny County given the high profile outbreak investigation at the VA 
Pittsburgh Health System hospital [107].  Nevertheless, the vast majority of LD in Allegheny 
County is sporadic, community-acquired LD and the environmental source is unknown.   
Chapters three and four of this dissertation are of particular public health significance for 
sporadic and outbreak-associated LD prevention in Allegheny County.  In chapter three, we 
identified important characteristics of Allegheny County cooling towers that were associated 
with higher Legionella concentration such as cooling tower age.  As a result, ACHD developed 
and broadly distributed recommendations in Allegheny County to influence maintenance 
practices and reduce the risk of Legionella contamination in these structures.  Although many of 
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the cooling towers we sampled were related to healthcare facilities, this particular project has the 
potential to influence both cooling tower-associated community-acquired and healthcare-
associated LD.  We also established important relationships with Allegheny County water 
treatment professionals who were imperative to the success of the study.  Collaboration with 
these professionals provided invaluable insight and established contacts for potential future 
consultation.  Additionally, the spatiotemporal cluster detection method described in chapter four 
established the use of this cluster detection method for LD in Allegheny County and enabled 
ACHD to use this method to analyze other infectious conditions.  The collaboration between 
ACHD and DOHMH epidemiologists was critical to this simulation study and underscores the 
importance of health department collaborations to advance public health practice. 
5.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Additional, large-scale epidemiologic research needs to be conducted to further assess the 
environmental sources of sporadic, community-acquired LD and their respective relative 
importance.  The narrative literature review presented in chapter two highlights the lack of 
research in this area and suggests environmental sources to target for additional research such as 
cooling towers.  Ideally, a case-control study should be conducted that would assess the risk 
factors and environmental exposures of sporadic, community-acquired LD cases compared to 
controls potentially matched on age and gender.  If conducted in Allegheny County, this type of 
study could more definitively identify sources of sporadic disease and thus targets for 
intervention in Allegheny County.     
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Furthermore, this case-control study could be expanded to included cases and controls 
from multiple geographic regions in addition to Allegheny County.  This expansion would allow 
for the specifics of geographic location (i.e. weather, topography) to be compared.  For example, 
in Allegheny County, potable water is obtained from surface water sources.  Examining LD 
cases in other geographic locations could help to explore the role of ground water-sourced 
potable water. 
The Allegheny County cooling tower Legionella prevalence study, as presented in 
chapter three, highlighted the importance of preemptively assessing cooling towers to potentially 
prevent sporadic and outbreak-associated LD.  A repeat survey should also be considered by the 
Allegheny County Health Department to determine if dissemination of recommendations led to 
decreased contamination.  Cooling tower age was the most important predictor of L. 
pneumophila concentration level.  Future research should further investigate the characteristics 
and maintenance practices associated with lower Legionella concentration levels specifically in 
older towers.  This research could identify prevention strategies effective for older towers and 
may also suggest an appropriate replacement age if remediation efforts are unsuccessful.   
The Allegheny County cooling tower Legionella prevalence study also helped to identify 
a proportion of cooling towers in Allegheny County; however, it is likely that the majority of 
cooling towers have yet to be identified.  Identification of all Allegheny County cooling towers 
through a cooling tower registration could aid ACHD in future cluster investigations.  The 
impact of cooling tower regulation in NYC is being studied by the NYC Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH).  Based on the results of this DOHMH analysis, other 
jurisdictions including Allegheny County may need to consider the utility of cooling tower 
registration and/or regulation. 
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The spatiotemporal cluster detection method is now being utilized by ACHD for 
prospective LD cluster detection.  The real-time utility of this method in Allegheny County 
remains to be seen.  Ultimately, this system will need to be sensitive in detecting outbreaks and 
yet have a high positive predictive value to minimize the number of false alarms.  The results of 
the simulations as presented in chapter four are promising especially for identification of large 
cooling tower-associated LD outbreaks.  In the future, ACHD should evaluate the application of 
this spatiotemporal cluster detection method for other infectious conditions such as sexually 
transmitted infections and non-infectious outcomes such as opioid overdose deaths. 
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